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RESCUING RULE 3(c) FROM THE 800-POUND 
GORILLA: THE CASE FOR A NO-NONSENSE 
APPROACH TO DEFECTIVE NOTICES OF APPEAL 
PHILIP A. PUCILLO* 
[The court's] "reasoning" is known in forums less august than 
this United States Court of Appeals as an "800-pound gorilla 
rule. " That is to say, even though this court has no authority 
whatever to excuse compliance with Rule 3(c)(J)(C), it 
nevertheless has the "power" to do so because more active judges 
on this court are willing to excuse noncompliance with the rule 
than are unwilling to do so. 1 
Introduction 
The content requirements of a notice of appeal, as set forth in Rule 3( c) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, could not be more straightforward. The 
enforcement of those requirements by the federal courts of appeals, however, 
has become quite convoluted. The purpose of this Article is to offer an 
approach to the enforcement ofRule 3( c) that is as clear-cut as its requirements. 
Rule 3( c )2 prescribes that a notice of appeal "specify the party or parties 
taking the appeal'';3 "designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being 
• Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan; A.B., 
Lafayette College; J.D., Tulane Law School. The Author extends his gratitude to Bruce 
Frohnen and Edward Lyons for their counsel and encouragement throughout the preparation of 
this Article and to Anthony Starkus, Karlye Horton, and Cimarron Gilson for their contributions 
to its content. 
l. Dillon v. United States, 184 F.3d 556, 559 (6th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (Ryan, J., 
dissenting). 
2. Following a restyling of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1998, 
Rule 3( c) was converted from a single paragraph of text into five numbered paragraphs, with 
the first of these paragraphs containing the respective content requirements of a notice of appeal 
in the lettered subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). See FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee's note 
(1998 Amendments); 20 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 303App.07[ 1) (3d ed. 2005); l6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD 
H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3949.4 (3d ed. 1999). The actual focus of 
this Article, therefore, is Rule 3(c)(1). The pertinent provision will nevertheless be referred to 
simply as "Rule 3( c)" in order to maintain consistency with references to that provision in cases 
and other literature authored prior to the restyling. 
3. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(A). 
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appealed";4 and "name the court to which the appeal is taken."5 When 
confronted with a notice that fails to comply with one or more of these 
requirements, the federal courts of appeals have resorted to a variety of differing 
responses. Some courts, viewing the dictates of Rule 3( c) as jurisdictional in 
nature, have simply dismissed the appeal in question for want of jurisdiction. 
Rejecting this jurisdictional conception, other courts have reached the merits of 
the appeal, despite the violation of Rule 3(c), as long as the violation did not 
prejudice or mislead the appellee. Alternatively, in order to avoid the difficult 
choice between dismissing the appeal and excusing the violation, some courts 
have distorted the relevant requirement of Rule 3( c) in order to conclude that 
there was no violation after all. 
In fairness to the courts of appeals, their disordered enforcement ofRule 3( c) 
stems from faulty direction on the part the Supreme Court of the United States. 
In Foman v. Davis,6 the Court characterized noncompliance with the content 
requirements of a notice of appeal as "mere technicalities" that can be readily 
forgiven when the pertinent defect does not mislead or prejudice the appellee.7 
The Court radically shifted course in the subsequent case of Torres v. Oakland 
Scavenger Co., 8 where it held that Rule 3( c) is a jurisdictional prerequisite and 
emphasized that noncompliance with its requirements was fatal to an appeal.9 
However, rather than repudiatingF oman as incompatible with its new approach, 
the Torres Court simply distinguished Foman on a dubious basis. 10 To further 
complicate matters, the Court has favorably cited incompatible aspects of 
Foman on several occasions since Torres.u 
This Article contends that the confusion and unpredictability that has plagued 
the enforcement of Rule 3( c) in the courts of appeals can be easily remedied 
through the Supreme Court's prescription of a no-nonsense approach to 
defective notices of appeal. First and foremost, this approach would demand 
that a court of appeals treat a litigant's violation of a requirement ofRule 3(c) 
as such, rather than resorting to crafty interpretations of the requirement at issue 
in an effort to cleanse the notice of the defect. Second, once satisfied that a 
violation exists, the court must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
pursuant to the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c) espoused in Torres. To 
4. /d. 3(c)(l)(B). 
5. /d. 3(c)(1)(C). 
6. 371 U.S. 178(1962). 
7. /d. at 181. 
8. 487 u.s. 312 (1988). 
9. /d. at 317. 
10. /d. at 316-17. 
11. See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767-68 (2001); FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. 
Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269,276 n.6 (1991). 
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the extent that F oman would authorize the court to reach the merits of the appeal 
notwithstanding the defect, it is irreconcilable with Torres and must be expressly 
overruled. 
The proposed approach would have the unfortunate effect of depriving many 
litigants of the opportunity to prosecute an appeal, including those litigants who 
would have prevailed on appeal were it not for a dismissal based upon a 
violation of Rule 3( c). But while the courts of appeals will lack the authority to 
determine where justice lies in those individual appeals, a no-nonsense 
enforcement of Rule 3( c) would lead to a significantly greater degree of justice 
in the totality of appeals by securing a fair and orderly process. Moreover, the 
mechanism of rule amendment can always be utilized to ease compliance with 
those requirements, or to abolish one or more of them altogether. For these 
reasons, a court of appeals may, in good conscience, resist the temptation to 
sustain an appeal either by forgiving a Rule 3( c) violation because it did not 
mislead or prejudice the appellee, or by dodging that inquiry through the 
creation of an "800-pound gorilla rule," as one circuit judge characterized his 
court's determination that a notice of appeal containing the name of no court of 
appeals whatsoever had somehow managed to "name the court to which the 
appeal [was] taken" within the meaning of Rule 3( c ). 12 
Part I of this Article provides background on the provisions and doctrines 
governing both the timing and content of a notice of appeal. Part II explores the 
Supreme Court's muddled jurisprudence on the content requirements contained 
in Rule 3(c), with an emphasis on the Torres Court's jurisdictional conception 
of those requirements and the incompatibility of that conception with the 
underpinnings of its prior decision in Foman. Part ill, which assesses the post-
Torres application of Rule 3(c)'s requirements among the courts of appeals, 
demonstrates how each of those requirements has been subject to conflicting 
enforcement approaches, even within the same court. Lastly, Part N of the 
Article examines how a no-nonsense enforcement of those requirements would 
assuage the confusion and unpredictability that conflicting enforcement has 
wrought. 
I. The Timing and Content Requirements of a Notice of Appeal 
In the federal judicial system, the course of action that a litigant must employ 
to initiate an appeal from a decision of a district court depends upon the nature 
of the decision to be challenged. 13 With respect to a decision that a litigant may 
12. See supra note l and accompanying text. See generally FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(C) 
(containing the quoted language). 
13. In addition to decisions of district courts, a significant component of the federal 
appellate docket concerns decisions of federal administrative agencies. A litigant initiates a 
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appeal only with the permission of the appropriate court of appeals, 14 the 
prescribed method is to file with that court a petition for permission to appeal. 15 
The focus of this Article, however, is on the requisite procedure for commencing 
an appeal from a decision that is appealable as a matter of right, 16 namely, the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal with the district court that rendered the 
decision. 17 
On the surface, a notice of appeal appears to be a document of little to no 
significance, considering that it is typically a single page in length and conveys 
only a minimal amount of information. 18 As many disappointed litigants have 
discovered over the years, however, the various requirements of timing and 
content that pertain to a notice of appeal carry jurisdictional repercussions. 
Accordingly, the failure to comply with those requirements often results in the 
loss of an opportunity to appeal. 
challenge to the decision of a federal administrative agency not by filing a notice of appeal, but 
by filing "a petition for review with the clerk of a court of appeals authorized to review the 
agency order." FED. R. APP. P. 15(a)(1). 
14. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) ("When a district judge, in making in a civil 
action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such 
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of 
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its 
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order .... " (emphasis added)); 
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f) ("A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order 
of a district court granting or denying class action certification .... "(emphasis added)). 
15. FED. R. APP. P. 5(a)(l) ("To request permission to appeal when an appeal is within the 
court of appeals' discretion, a party must file a petition for permission to appeal."). 
16. See 28 U.S. C.§ 1291 (2000)(granting appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States"); id. § 1292(a)(1) (granting appellate 
jurisdiction over "appeals from ... [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United 
States ... or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving 
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions"); id. § 1292(a)(2) (granting appellate 
jurisdiction over "appeals from ... [i]nterlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing 
orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as 
directing sales or other disposals of property"); id. § 1292(a)(3) (granting appellate jurisdiction 
over "appeals from ... [i]nterlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof 
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final 
decrees are allowed"). 
17. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1) ("An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court 
to a court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk .... "). 
18. See id. app., form 1 (Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals from a Judgment or Order 
of a District Court); id. 3(c)(5) ("Form 1 in the Appendix of Forms is a suggested form of a 
notice of appeal."). 
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A. The Timing Requirements of Rule 4 
The starting point for a discussion of the timing and content requirements of 
a notice of appeal is Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which 
provides that "[a]n appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court to a 
court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district 
clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4."19 The time limit imposed by Rule 4 for 
any given appeal depends primarily upon the nature of the underlying action. 
In a civil proceeding, a litigant generally has thirty days from the district court's 
entry of a judgment or order in which to file a notice of appeal. 20 This thirty-day 
limit converts to a sixty-day limit, however, if the federal government (or an 
officer or agency thereof) is a party to the litigation.21 In a criminal proceeding, 
on the other hand, the time limit depends further upon the status of the 
prospective appellant: a defendant has only ten days to file a notice of appeal, 22 
while the government has thirty days.23 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the preceding timing 
requirements of a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature. The Court 
squarely addressed the issue for the first time in United States v. Robinson.24 
Robinson concerned two defendants who sought to challenge a judgment of 
conviction in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.25 Their notices of 
appeal, however, were filed in excess of the ten-day limit set forth in then-
Rule 37(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.26 Based upon the 
19. /d. 3(a)(l) (emphasis added). 
20. /d. 4(a)(l)(A)("In a civil case, ... the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed 
with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered."). 
This thirty-day requirement reflects 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which provides in relevant part that "no 
appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature 
before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the 
entry of such judgment, order or decree." 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000). 
21. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(l)(B) ("When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, 
the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order 
appealed from is entered."). This sixty-day limit also reflects§ 2107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) 
("In any such action, suit or proceeding in which the United States or an officer or agency 
thereof is a party, the time as to all parties shall be sixty days from such entry."). 
22. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(l)(A) ("In a criminal case, a defendant's notice of appeal must be 
filed in the district court within I 0 days after the later of: (i) the entry of either the judgment or 
the order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of the government's notice of appeal."). 
23. /d. 4(b)(l)(B) ("When the government is entitled to appeal, its notice of appeal must 
be filed in the district court within 30 days after the later of: (i) the entry of the judgment or 
order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any defendant."). 
24. 361 u.s. 220 (1960). 
25. See id. at 220-21. 
26. Seeid. at221. See generally FED. R.CRIM.P. 37(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. app. (1958)(repealed 
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district court's finding that the defendants' failure to file their notices in time 
resulted from excusable neglect, the D.C. Circuit held that the notices were 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the appeals.27 
In reversing the D.C. Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
conclusion, which most courts of appeals had reached by that point, that "the 
filing of a notice of appeal within the 1 0-day period prescribed by Rule 3 7 (a )(2) 
is mandatory and jurisdictional. "28 The Court relied primarily upon then-
Rule 45(b) ofthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stated in pertinent 
part that "the court may not enlarge the period ... for taking an appeal."29 
Describing this language as "quite plain and clear," the Court was satisfied that 
"to recognize a late notice of appeal is actually to 'enlarge' the period for taking 
an appeal" within the meaning of then-Rule 45(b).30 Although noting that 
"powerful policy arguments may be made both for and against greater flexibility 
with respect to the time for the taking of an appeal," the Court opined that such 
a matter "must be resolved through the rule-making process and not by judicial 
decision."31 
1968) (providing the rule in effect at the time of the case: "An appeal by a defendant may be 
taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from .... "). Rule 37(a)(2) 
is the predecessor to Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See infra note 3 1 
and accompanying text. 
27. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 221-22. 
28. !d. at 224. 
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b), 18 U.S.C. app. (1958) (repealed 1968). 
30. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 224. 
31. !d. at 229. In the wake of Robinson, Rule 37(a)(2) was amended to authorize a district 
court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal "[ u ]pon a showing of excusable neglect." 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. app. (Supp. II 1967) (repealed 1968). At the same time, 
Rule 37(a)(2)'s counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to authorize 
such extensions in civil cases. See FED. R. CN. P. 73(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. II 1967) 
(repealed 1968). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure currently permits 
extensions in both civil and criminal cases for either excusable neglect or good cause. See FED. 
R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), 4(b)(4). 
A civil litigant who cannot make the showing necessary to obtain an extension under 
Rule 4(a)(5)(A) can instead bring a motion to reopen the time to file a notice of appeal, which 
the district court may grant if all of the following conditions are met: 
(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered 
or within 7 days after the moving party receives notice ofthe entry, whichever is 
earlier; 
(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to notice of the entry of 
the judgment or order sought to be appealed but did not receive the notice from 
the district court or any party within 21 days after entry; and 
(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced. 
!d. 4(a)(6). This device reflects the substance of section 2107(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) 
(2000) ("[I]fthe district court finds-( I) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment 
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Several years after Robinson, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure absorbed the timing requirements prescribed by Rule 37(a)(2), along 
with the timing requirements prescribed by its counterpart in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.32 The Supreme Court has since extended to civil 
proceedings its determination in Robinson that the timing requirements in 
criminal proceedings are "mandatory and jurisdictional."33 Accordingly, the 
jurisdictional nature of Rule 4's timing requirements in both the civil and 
criminal contexts is now firmly established. 
B. The Content Requirements of Rule 3(c) 
While prescribing the timing requirements of a notice of appeal, Rule 4 
provides no direction regarding the information that a notice of appeal must 
convey. The subject of content is instead addressed by Rule 3(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure,34 which states that a notice of appeal must 
"specify the party or parties taking the appeal";35 "designate the judgment, order, 
or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and 
(2) that no party would be prejudiced, the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days 
after entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is 
earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order 
reopening the time for appeal."). 
32. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) advisory committee's note (1967 Adoption) ("This subdivision is 
derived from FRCP 73(a) without any change of substance."); id. 4(b) advisory committee's 
note (1967 Adoption) ("This subdivision is derived from FRCrP 37(a)(2) without change of 
substance."). 
33. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982); Browder v. Dir., 
Dep't ofCorr., 434 U.S. 257,264 (1978). Interestingly, the Browder Court did not rely upon 
the language of§ 21 07(a) in recognizing the jurisdictional nature ofthe timing requirements of 
a notice of appeal in a civil proceeding. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 21 07(a) (2000) ("Except as 
otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an 
action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of 
appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree."). Instead, 
the Court based its determination on the Robinson Court's recognition of then-Rule 37(a)(2) as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Browder, 434 U.S. at 264. 
34. When adopted, Rule 3(c) absorbed the content requirements of a notice of appeal 
previously set forth in Rule 73(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 37(a)(l) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee's note 
(1967 Adoption) ("This subdivision is identical with corresponding provisions in FRCP 73(b) 
and FRCrP 37(a)(1)."). 
35. Id 3(c)(1)(A). In its entirety, this subdivision provides the following: 
(I) The notice of appeal must: 
(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the 
caption or body of the notice, but an attorney representing more than one party 
may describe those parties with such terms as "all plaintiffs, " "the defendants, " 
"the plaintiffs A, B, eta/.," or "all defendants except X" 
Id (emphasis added). The emphasized language was added in response to the Supreme Court's 
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or part thereof being appealed";36 and "name the court to which the appeal is 
taken.'m Notwithstanding the straightforward nature of these requirements,38 
it is not uncommon for a litigant to file a notice of appeal that fails to satisfy one 
or more of them. A court of appeals confronted with such a document must then 
determine if the defect results in a loss of jurisdiction over the appeal. 
Unfortunately for the courts of appeals, the question whether the content 
requirements ofRule 3( c) have the same jurisdictional significance as the timing 
requirements of Rule 4 has proven to be a thorny one for the Supreme Court. 
The following section details the Court's struggle with that question. 
II. Rule 3(c) as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite 
A. The Appellant-Friendly Approach ofFoman v. Davis 
The Supreme Court offered its first noteworthy statement regarding the nature 
of the content requirements of a notice of appeal in F oman v. Davis. 39 F oman 
arose from a suit by Lenore F oman against the executrix of her deceased father's 
estate.40 After the district court dismissed Fornan's complaint, she brought 
decision in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988). See infra notes 147-59 and 
accompanying text. 
Because Rule 3(c)(l)(A) requires specification only of the "party or parties taking the 
appeal," FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(A) (emphasis added), the courts of appeals have by and large 
rejected the contention that an appeal is subject to dismissal because the notice of appeal 
wrongfully omitted the name of an appellee. See, e.g., Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1031 
(7th Cir. 2000); MIF Realty v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 752 (6th Cir. 1995); Lackey v. At!. Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 
202, 206 (5th Cir. 1993); Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 531 n.9 (lOth Cir. 
1992); Hale v. Arizona, 967 F .2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1992); D.C. Nurses' Ass'n v. District of 
Columbia, 854 F.2d 1448, 1450 (D.C. Cir. l988)(per curiam); see also l6A WRIGHT,MILLER 
& COOPER, supra note 2, § 3949.4 (''Nor need the name of the prospective appellees be set forth 
in the body of the notice."). Contra Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F .3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 
1996) ("Crawford filed a timely notice of appeal as to defendants Medina, Kermendy, and 
Milligan only, thus abandoning her claims against defendant Slee."); Davis v. Fulton County, 
90 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[i]ntended appellees must be provided with 
notice that the appeal is being taken ... and the failure to list all in the notice of appeal could 
suggest abandonment of the claims against them"); 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, 
§ 303.20[2][b] ("If the notice of appeal specifically names some potential multiple appellees and 
fails to name others, jurisdiction over the omitted parties may be denied if they reasonably relied 
on the fact that they were not named and prejudice would result from their later inclusion."). 
36. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(B). 
37. /d. 3(c)(l)(C). 
38. See 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.20[1] (describing Rule 3(c)'s requirements 
as "obviously quite simple"). 
39. 371 u.s. 178 (1962). 
40. /d. at 179. 
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motions to vacate the judgment dismissing her complaint, and to amend her 
complaint.41 While these motions were pending, F oman initiated an appeal from 
the dismissal of her complaint by filing a notice of appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit.42 The pendency ofher motion to vacate judgment, 
however, rendered that notice ineffective.43 Foman filed a second notice of 
appeal after the district court denied both ofher motions.44 Although this second 
notice referred to the orders denying her motions, it provided no indication that 
Foman sought to appeal from the dismissal of her complaint as well.45 
Consequently, with respect to the dismissal of her complaint, Foman had failed 
to comply with the mandate of then-Rule 73(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that "[t]he notice of appeal ... shall designate the judgment or part 
thereof appealed from.'>46 
On appeal, the litigants briefed and argued the merits of the district court's 
dismissal of Foman's complaint as well as the denials of her motions.47 The 
First Circuit nevertheless held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the dismissal 
of the complaint.48 The court reasoned that neither ofF oman's notices of appeal 
conferred jurisdiction over that ruling, the first notice having no effect and the 
second notice failing to indicate that she was taking appeal from the dismissal 
ofher complaint.49 The court thus limited its review to the denials ofFoman's 
motions, affirming on both counts. 50 
41. !d. 
42. !d. 
43. The First Circuit construed Foman's motion to vacate judgment as one brought under 
Rule 59( e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. !d. at 180. At that time, the pendency of 
a timely Rule 59 motion would have invalidated any notice of appeal filed prior to the 
disposition of the motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 73(a), 28 U.S.C. app. (1958) (repealed 1968) 
(providing the rule in effect at the time of the case: "The running of the time for appeal is 
terminated ... and the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to 
be computed from the entry of any [order] ... granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to 
alter or amend the judgment .... "). 
Under the current framework, a notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of a timely 
Rule 59 motion is simply held in abeyance until the disposition of that motion and any related 
post-judgment motions. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). 
44. Foman, 371 U.S. at 179. 
45. !d. at 180-81. 
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 73(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (1958) (repealed 1968). Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure currently embodies this directive. See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
47. Foman, 371 U.S. at 179-80. 
48. See Foman v. Davis, 292 F.2d 85, 87 (1st Cir. 1961). 
49. !d. at 87-89. 
50. See id. at 87. 
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The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit's judgment, taking a tack that 
was rather charitable to Foman. At the outset of its analysis, the Court 
emphasized that "[t]he defect in [Foman's] second notice of appeal did not 
mislead or prejudice the [appellee]."51 The Court reached that determination 
after exploring whether Foman had· conveyed an intent to appeal from the 
dismissal of her complaint, finding that Foman's "intention to seek review of 
both the dismissal and the denial of the motions was manifest" when 
considering her two notices of appeal in conjunction with the litigants' briefs. 52 
''Not only did both parties brief and argue the merits of the earlier judgment on 
appeal," the Court observed, "but [Foman's] statement of points on which she 
intended to rely on appeal ... similarly demonstrated the intent to challenge the 
dismissal."53 The Court was satisfied, therefore, that the First Circuit should 
have regarded F oman's second notice of appeal as "an effective, although inept, 
attempt to appeal from the judgment sought to be vacated."54 The Court then 
concluded its analysis with the following sentiment: 
It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be 
avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities. The Federal Rules 
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the 
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper 
decision on the merits. 55 
The precise basis for the Court's holding that Foman could appeal from the 
dismissal of her complaint, despite her failure to designate that ruling in her 
notice of appeal in accordance with then-Rule 73(b ), is difficult to discern. On 
one hand, the Court seemed to espouse the narrow principle that noncompliance 
with a content requirement of a notice of appeal is excusable so long as the 
violation does not mislead or prejudice the appellee. 56 Applying that principle, 
the Court would have been unable to conclude that F oman's failure to designate 
the dismissal ofher complaint in her only valid notice of appeal was misleading 
or prejudicial, considering that Foman had manifested an intent to appeal from 
that ruling through her other submissions. 
51. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. 
52. /d. 
53. /d. 
54. /d. 
55. /d. at 181-82 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. See id. at 181 (observing that "[t]he defect in the second notice of appeal did not 
mislead or prejudice the [appellee]"). 
2006] RESCUING RULE 3(c) 281 
On the other hand, Foman is susceptible to a much broader reading in light 
of the Court's concluding rhetoric. By characterizing Foman 's violation of then-
Rule 73(b)'s judgment-designation requirement as a mere technicality and 
stressing that a court's refusal to consider the merits of an appeal on that basis 
would be "entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,"57 the Court strongly suggested that a failure to comply with a 
content requirement of the notice of appeal should virtually never result in 
dismissal of an appeal. The Court's subsequent statement that "[t]he Federal 
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep 
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the 
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits" only serves 
to support such a reading. 58 Accordingly, the Court likely would have reached 
the merits ofFoman's appeal from the dismissal ofher complaint even ifher 
failure to designate that ruling in her notice of appeal had indeed been 
misleading or prejudicial to the appellee. 
B. A Change of Course in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co. 
Regardless of the intended effect of Foman, the Court dramatically altered its 
conception of the content requirements of the notice of appeal twenty-six years 
later in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co. 59 Torres involved a suit in which 
sixteen individuals intervened as plaintiffs after the original plaintiffs to the suit 
executed a settlement agreement with the defendant.60 Following the district 
court's dismissal of their complaint, the plaintiff-intervenors filed a notice of 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.61 The caption of the notice 
set forth the name of a single plaintiff-intervenor, followed by the phrase "et 
al."62 The body of the notice listed the names of each plaintiff-intervenor in 
alphabetical sequence, with the exception of Jose Torres.63 The notice's 
omission of Torres's name ostensibly resulted from a simple oversight on the 
part of his counsel's secretary.64 Notwithstanding the inadvertent nature of the 
omission, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over 
the appeal as it pertained to Torres.65 
57. !d. 
58. See id. at 181-82 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
59. 487 u.s. 312 (1988). 
60. !d. at 313. 
61. !d. 
62. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Torres, 487 U.S. 312 (No. 86-1845), 1987 WL 880529. 
63. !d. 
64. Torres, 487 U.S. at 3 13; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 62, at 6. 
65. Torres, 487 U.S. at 317. 
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1. Rule 3(c): Party-Specification Requirement 
The Court applied a fairly rigid analysis in determining that the notice of 
appeal in question did not "specify" Torres as mandated by Rule 3(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.66 In the process, the Court addressed its 
prior approach in Foman simply by accepting what it characterized as "the 
important principle for which Foman stands,'m7 namely, "that the requirements 
of the rules of procedure should be liberally construed and that 'mere 
technicalities' should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its 
merits."68 Accordingly, the Court continued, a litigant's filing that is 
"technically at variance with the letter of a procedural rule" might nevertheless 
comply with that rule if the filing constitutes ''the functional equivalent of what 
the rule requires.'m9 But Torres, in the Court's view, had failed to file even the 
functional equivalent of a notice of appeal, considering that "he was never 
named or otherwise designated, however inartfully [sic], in the notice of appeal 
filed by the 15 other intervenors."70 The Court thus determined that Torres did 
not satisfy Rule 3( c)'s party-specification requirement, "even liberally 
construed.''71 
In so ruling, the Court rejected Torres's assertion that the inclusion of the 
phrase "et al.'' in the caption ofthe notice of appeal had the effect of satisfying 
Rule 3( c)'s party-specification requirement. 72 Noting that"[ t]he purpose of the 
66. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c), 28 U.S.C. app. (1982) (amended 1993) ("The notice of appeal 
shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal .... "). The party-specification requirement 
is now contained in Rule 3(c)(1)(A). See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
67. Torres, 487 U.S. at 316. 
68. !d. (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)). While explicitly referring to 
Foman's statement that "[i]t is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such 
mere technicalities," Foman, 371 U.S. at 181, the Torres Court omitted any reference to a 
significant aspect of the immediately following statement in Foman, specifically, that "[t]he 
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by 
counsel may be decisive to the outcome." !d. at 181-82 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). See Torres, 487 U.S. at 316. Presumably, the Court's omission was deliberate, 
considering that Torres turned out to be a case in which "one misstep by counsel [was] decisive 
to the outcome." See Foman, 371 U.S. at 181-82. 
69. Torres, 487 at 316-17 (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)). 
70. !d. at 317. 
71. !d. 
72. See id. at 317-18. Although agreeing with the Court that the notice of appeal's 
inclusion of the phrase "et al." did not effectively "specify" Torres pursuant to Rule 3( c), Justice 
Scalia opined that the principles espoused by the Court should have led to a contrary 
conclusion. See id. at 318-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If it is the fact that the 
requirements of the rules of procedure should be 'liberally construed,' that 'mere technicalities 
should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits,' and that a rule is complied 
with if'the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires,' it would seem 
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specificity requirement is to provide notice both to the opposition and to the 
court of the identity of the appellant or appellants,"73 the Court explained that 
the requirement could be met "only by some designation that gives fair notice 
of the specific individual or entity seeking to appeal."74 The Court found that 
"[t]he use of the phrase 'et al.,' which literally means 'and others,' utterly fails 
to provide such notice to either intended recipient."75 If such a "vague 
designation" were sufficient, the Court elaborated, ''the appellee and the court 
[would be] unable to determine with certitude whether a losing party not named 
in the notice of appeal should be bound by an adverse judgment or held liable 
for costs or sanctions."76 
2. A Jurisdictional Conception of Rule 3(c) 's Requirements 
Although the Court's analysis regarding Torres's noncompliance with 
Rule 3( c)'s party-specification requirement was significant, the most profound 
implications of Torres emerge from its conception ofRule 3(c)'s requirements 
as jurisdictional in nature.77 In this respect, the Court, as it did in Robinson 
almost thirty years earlier, relied principally upon the inability of the courts of 
appeals to enlarge the time in which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.78 The 
to me that a caption listing the first party to the case and then adding 'et al.' is enough to suggest 
that all parties are taking the appeal; and that the later omission of one of the parties in listing 
the appellants can, 'liberally viewed,' be deemed to create no more than an ambiguity which 
does not destroy the effect of putting the appellee on notice." (internal citation omitted)). 
73. !d. at 318 (majority opinion). 
74. !d. 
75. !d. 
76. !d. Rule 3( c) has since been amended to allow for the specification of a party using the 
phrase "et al." See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
77. For a discussion of pre-Torres cases addressing the nature of Rule 3(c)'s party-
specification requirement, see Nancy J. Gegenheimer, Party Names on the Notice of Appeal: 
Strict Adherence to Federal Appellate Rule 3 After Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Company, 69 
DENY. U. L. REv. 725, 730-32 (1992); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Case Note, Torres v. Oakland 
Scavenger Co.: What's in a Name?-Everything in a Federal Appeal, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
943,945-48 (1989). See also KennethJ. Servay, The 1993 Amendments to Rules 3 and4 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-A Bridge over Troubled Water-Or Just Another Trap?, 
157 F.R.D. 587,589 nn.17-18 (1994) (collecting cases). 
78. The operative provision in Torres was Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which provided the following: 
The court for good cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by 
these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may permit an act to be done after 
the expiration of such time; but the court may not enlarge the time for filing a 
notice of appeal .... 
FED. R. APP. P. 26(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (1982) (amended 1998) (emphasis added). The current 
version of Rule 26(b), although stylistically and structurally different, has retained the same 
substance. See FED. R. APP. P. 26(b)(1) ("For good cause, the court may extend the time 
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Court was particularly concerned that ''the mandatory nature of the time limits 
contained in Rule 4 would be vitiated if courts of appeals were permitted to 
exercise jurisdiction over parties not named in the notice of appeal."79 The 
Court explained that, once the time to file a notice of appeal has elapsed, the 
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over parties not specified in the notice would 
be tantamount to extending the time to file the notice in the first instance.80 
"Because the Rules do not grant courts the latter power," the Court reasoned, 
"we hold that the Rules likewise withhold the former."81 
The Court found further support for its jurisdictional conception of 
Rule 3{c)'s requirements in the relationship between Rule 3(c) and Rule 4.82 In 
particular, the Court deemed Rule 3(c)'s content requirements and Rule 4's 
timing requirements as inextricably linked, based upon its reading of the 
following statement issued by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure at the time of Rule 3 's adoption: 
Rule 3 and Rule 4 combine to require that a notice of appeal be filed 
with the clerk of the district court within the time prescribed for 
taking an appeal. Because the timely filing of a notice of appeal is 
mandatory and jurisdictional, compliance with the provisions of 
those rules is of the utmost importance. 83 
The Court emphasized that the Advisory Committee's admonition did not 
distinguish the respective requirements of Rule 3 and Rule 4, but instead "treats 
the requirements of the two Rules as a single jurisdictional threshold."84 The 
Court was satisfied, therefore, that the Advisory Committee itself regarded 
Rule 3( c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite. 85 
prescribed by these rules or by its order to perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after 
that time expires. But the court may not extend the time to file . .. a notice of appeal (except 
as authorized in Rule 4) ... . "(emphasis added)). 
79. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315. 
80. /d. ("Permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the time for 
filing a notice of appeal has passed is equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for 
filing a notice of appeal."). 
81. /d. 
82. /d. 
83. /d. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory 
committee's note (1967 Adoption)). 
84. /d. 
85. /d. at 316 ("Our conclusion that the Advisory Committee viewed the requirements of 
Rule 3 as jurisdictional in nature, although not determinative, is of weight in our construction 
ofthe Rule." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
In dissent, Justice Brennan strenuously disagreed with the Court's interpretation of the 
Advisory Committee's statements: 
The comment itself says only that the "timely filing" requirement is mandatory and 
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In light of its jurisdictional conception of Rule 3( c)'s requirements, the Court 
concluded that the unavoidable consequence ofTorres's failure to abide by the 
party-specification requirement was dismissal of his appeal. Even though the 
dismissal resulted solely from a deficiency in the notice of appeal at issue, the 
Court found no solace for Torres in Rule 3( c)'s safeguard that"[ a ]n appeal shall 
not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal. "86 The 
Court explained summarily that "[t]he failure to name a party in a notice of 
appeal is more than excusable 'informality'; it constitutes a failure of that party 
to appeal. "87 
The Court offered two additional observations of note in connection with its 
understanding ofRule 3(c)'s requirements as jurisdictional in nature. First, in 
rejecting Torres's contention that a deficiency in a notice of appeal ought to be 
subject to review for "harmless error," the Court highlighted that the contention 
"misunderstands the nature of a jurisdictional requirement: a litigant's failure to 
clear a jurisdictional hurdle can never be 'harmless' or waived by a court."88 
Second, the Court explicitly acknowledged that its jurisdictional understanding 
of Rule 3(c) had produced "a harsh result in this case."89 The Court's 
jurisdictional; significantly, the Advisory Committee stopped short of describing 
Rules 3 and 4 as jurisdictional in their entirety. Moreover, it is apparent from the 
context that the Advisory Committee did not intend to incorporate by reference 
every requirement of the two Rules, but rather, only those provisions discussed in 
the first sentence of the comment. Rule 3(a) provides that an appeal "shall be 
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within the time 
allowed by Rule 4." It is thus this provision- which is tracked nearly word for 
word in the Advisory Committee Note- and not every enumerated requirement 
of Rule 3, that combines with Rule 4 to form the jurisdictional requirement "that 
a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court within the time 
prescribed for taking an appeal." 
/d. at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c), 28 U.S.C. app. (1982)(amended 1993). The provision in question 
currently reads: "An appeal must not be dismissed for informality ofform or title of the notice 
of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the 
notice." FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4) (emphasis added). The emphasized language was added in 
response to To"es. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55. 
87. To"es, 487 U.S. at 314. 
88. /d. at 317 n.3. Notwithstanding the To"es Court's emphasis that Rule 3(c)'s 
jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived, one prominent treatise has opined that courts 
should nonetheless waive violations of the judgment-designation requirement in the appropriate 
circumstances. See 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21 [3][ c][ii] ("Although the holding 
of To"es made clear that the requirements of Appellate Rule 3 are jurisdictional, a technical 
mistake in naming the order appealed from should not deprive the court of jurisdiction as long 
as the intent to appeal from the order or judgment can be inferred from the record as a whole 
and the opposing party cannot show prejudice."). 
89. To"es, 487 U.S. at 318. 
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conscience was eased, however, to the extent that ''the harshness of our 
construction is imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process."90 
3. Sidestepping Foman 
The most intriguing aspect ofthe Torres Court's jurisdictional approach to 
Rule 3(c)'s requirements was its failure to adequately address the forgiving 
approach established in Foman. The Court's only treatment of Foman in this 
regard was to assert that there was no need in Foman to consider whether the 
judgment-designation requirement of then-Rule 73(b)91 was jurisdictional in 
nature,92 given the Foman Court's purported conclusion that "in light of all the 
circumstances, the Rule had been complied with."93 This assertion is dubious 
at best, however, considering the principal finding in Foman that "(t]he defect 
in [Foman's] second notice of appeal did not mislead or prejudice the 
[appellee]."94 Indeed, the Foman Court explored whether Foman's second 
notice of appeal had misled or prejudiced the appellee precisely because that 
notice had failed to comply with the judgment-designation requirement at issue. 
Regardless of whether the Torres Court was willing to acknowledge it, the 
fact remains that its jurisdictional conception ofRule 3( c)'s requirements wholly 
repudiated the principles upon which Foman rested. Had the Torres Court 
desired to adhere to Foman, its determination that Torres had failed to comply 
with Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement would have been followed by 
an examination of whether that noncompliance had misled or prejudiced the 
appellee.95 Such an approach, however, is entirely contrary to a jurisdictional 
conception ofRule 3(c), particularly in view ofthe Torres Court's admonition 
90. /d. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
91. The Torres Court erroneously cited Rule 3(c) as the operative rule in Foman. See id. 
at 316 ("Foman did not address whether the requirement of Rule 3(c) at issue in that case was 
jurisdictional in nature .... "). In fact, the promulgation of Rule 3 did not occur until several 
years after Foman was decided. See FED. R. APP. P. 3 advisory committee's note (1967 
Adoption). 
92. While the Torres majority was satisfied that Foman had not addressed whether 
Rule 3(c)'s judgment-designation requirement was jurisdictional in nature, Justice Brennan 
insisted that Foman had rejected that understanding. Compare Torres, 487 U.S. at 316 
("Foman did not address whether the requirement of Rule 3(c) at issue in that case was 
jurisdictional in nature ... . "),with id. at 322 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (depicting Foman as 
holding that "Rule 3(c)'sjudgment-designation requirement is not jurisdictional"). 
93. /d. at 316 (majority opinion). In making this determination, the Torres Court appeared 
to rely primarily upon the statement that Foman's second notice of appeal should have been 
regarded as "an effective, although inept, attempt to appeal from the judgment sought to be 
vacated," Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962). 
94. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. 
95. See id. 
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that "a litigant's failure to clear a jurisdictional hurdle can never be 'harmless' 
or waived by a court. •>96 
Nor can the spirit animatingFoman's concluding rhetoric be reconciled with 
a jurisdictional conception of Rule 3( c)'s requirements. As observed above, the 
F oman Court equated noncompliance with the content requirements of a notice 
of appeal as a "mere technicality" that should not preclude the consideration of 
appeal on the merits. 97 The Court also suggested that the outcome of an appeal 
must not hinge on "one misstep by counsel."98 These ideals, however, are 
plainly incompatible with the Torres Court's holding that a court of appeals 
lacked jurisdiction over a litigant's appeal solely because his counsel's secretary 
mistakenly omitted his name from a notice of appeal. Yet, as the Torres Court 
noted, its conception of Rule 3( c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite compelled this 
admittedly harsh disposition. 99 
C. The Affirmation oftheJurisdictional Conception of Rule 3(c) 
Notwithstanding any inconsistencies with Foman, the Torres Court's 
conception of Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite has endured. First, in 
two post-Torres cases involving allegedly defective notices of appeal, the Court 
has expressly described Rule 3( c)'s requirements as jurisdictional in nature. 100 
Second, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
has posed no challenge to the Torres Court's conclusion that the committee 
itself understood Rule 3(c)'s requirements to be jurisdictional in nature at the 
time of Rule 3 's adoption. 101 Instead, the committee's sole response to Torres 
has been to amend Rule 3( c) in order to facilitate compliance with the party-
specification requirement. 
1. The Court Stands by Torres 
The Supreme Court's initial affirmation of Torres occurred in Smith v. 
Barry. 102 Smith involved a suit brought by William Smith, a state prisoner, in 
which he asserted that various prison officials had violated his rights under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 103 At the conclusion of trial, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Smith solely regarding his claims against two 
96. To"es, 487 U.S. at 317 n.3. 
97. Foman, 371 U.S. at 181. 
98. /d. at 181-82. 
99. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
100. See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 765 (2001); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 
248 (1992). 
1 01. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
102. 502 u.s. 244. 
103. /d. at 245. 
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prison psychologists. 104 The psychologists then timely moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict pursuant Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 105 While that motion was pending, Smith, acting pro se, filed a 
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 106 Smith's 
notice, however, met the same fate as did the frrst notice of appeal inFoman: the 
pendency of a post-judgment motion rendered the notice ineffective. 107 
Despite the ineffectiveness of Smith's notice of appeal, the Clerk of the 
Fourth Circuit responded to the filing by issuing to the litigants briefing forms 
used in pro se appeals to determine the necessity of an appointment of counsel 
and/or oral argument. 108 Smith completed the form and returned it to the court 
within the deadline required for the timely filing of a notice of appeal under 
Rule 4. 109 Although later conceding the ineffectiveness of his original notice of 
appeal, 110 Smith opposed dismissal of his appeal on the ground that the briefing 
form "effectively substituted for a second notice of appeal."111 
104. /d. at 245-46. 
105. /d. at 246. 
106. /d. The only ruling that Smith had designated in this notice of appeal was an order 
extending the time in which Smith had to file a motion for attorney fees. See Smith v. Galley, 
919 F.2d 893, 896 n.7 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992). 
107. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 1993) ("If a timely motion 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party ... for 
judgment under Rule 50(b)[,] ... the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of 
the order ... granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be 
filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion 
as provided above." (emphasis added)). 
108. Smith, 502 U.S. at 246. 
109. !d. at 246-47. 
110. Smith, 919 F.2d at 895. 
Ill. /d. Rule 3(a) required that Smith file his notice of appeal with the district court. See 
FED. R. APP. P. 3(a), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 1989) ("An appeal permitted by law as 
of right from a district court to a court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with 
the clerk of the district court within the time allowedby Rule 4."). Still, his act of filing the 
briefing form directly with the Fourth Circuit would not by itself have defeated his argument 
that the form substituted as a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(l), a notice of appeal 
erroneously filed with the court of appeals would have been deemed filed with the district court 
on the date that it was filed with the court of appeals. !d. 4(a)(l ), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) 
(amended 1993). Rule 4(d) currently embodies the substance of this provision. See 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(d) ("If a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case is mistakenly filed 
in the court of appeals, the clerk of that court must note on the notice the date when it was 
received and send it to the district clerk. The notice is then considered filed in the district court 
on the date so noted."). 
2006] RESCUING RULE 3(c) 289 
The Fourth Circuit rejected Smith's argument and dismissed his appeal 
accordingly. 112 Relying upon Torres, the court identified the pertinent issue as 
whether Smith's briefing form was "the 'functional equivalent' of a notice of 
appeal under Rule 3( c )."113 The court answered in the negative, explaining that 
''the document was not the result of Smith's intent to initiate an appeal,"114 but 
instead constituted Smith's effort to comply with an order of the court issued 
subsequent to the filing of an ineffective notice of appeal. 115 
In reversing the Fourth Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court determined 
that Smith's briefing form, or virtually any document for that matter, has the 
potential to serve as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. 116 The Court 
recognized that a notice of appeal "must specifically indicate the litigant's intent 
112. Smith, 919 F.2d at 896. 
113. Id. at 895 (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,317 (1988)). 
114. Id. at 895-96. 
115. Id. at 896. 
116. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992). Since Smith was decided, the courts of 
appeals have deemed a variety of documents as the "functional equivalent" of a notice of appeal, 
including: a motion for extension oftime to file a notice of appeal, see, e.g., Rinaldo v. Corbett, 
256 F.3d 1276, 1278-80 (11th Cir. 2001); a motion for certificate of probable cause, see, e.g., 
Rodgers v. Wyo. Att'y Gen., 205 F.3d 1201, 1204-06 (lOth Cir. 2000), overroled on other 
grounds by Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1239 (lOth Cir. 2001); a petition for permission to 
appeal, see, e.g., Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 395 F.3d 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2004); a petition 
for writ of mandamus, see, e.g., In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1996); a motion 
for appointment of counsel, see, e.g., Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 320 (lst Cir. 2003); 
a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, 
e.g., Hatfield v. Bd. of County Comrn'rs for Converse County, 52 F.3d 858, 860-62 (lOth Cir. 
1995); amotion to proceed in forma pauperis, see, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 75 F.3d 1137, 
1140-41 (7th Cir. 1996); a petition for common-law writ of certiorari, see, e.g., In re Urohealth 
Sys., Inc., 252 F.3d 504, 506-08 (1st Cir. 2001); a motion for certificate of appealability, see, 
e.g., Marmolejo v. United States, 196 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); a motion for 
leave to file a successive motion to attack sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, see, e.g., In re 
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605,607-08 (7th Cir. 1998); a designation of record on appeal, see, e.g., 
United States v. Adams, 106 F.3d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1997); a motion for clarification of a 
ruling, see, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 105 F.3d 793, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); an 
opening brief on appeal, see, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614,617-18 (9th 
Cir. 1993); and a motion for reduction of sentence, see, e.g., Brannan v. United States, 993 F.2d 
709, 710 (9th Cir. 1993). See also 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21 [2] (enumerating 
various documents that have been found to constitute the functional equivalent of a notice of 
appeal); DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 8.5 (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 
2005) (same). But see S.M. v. J.K., 262 F.3d 914, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a 
docketing statement could not serve as the "functional equivalent" of a notice of cross-appeal 
because the plaintiff had provided no reason why the court should exercise its discretion to do 
so); Harris v. Ballard, 158 F.3d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (concluding that a 
motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal cannot serve as the "functional 
equivalent" of a notice of appeal because it does not express an intention to appeal). 
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to seek appellate review," pointing out that ''the purpose of this requirement is 
to ensure that the filing provides sufficient notice to the other parties and the 
courts."117 Insisting that a document's sufficiency as a notice of appeal is a 
function of the notice that it affords, and not of a litigant's subjective motivation 
in filing it, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Smith's purpose 
for submitting the briefing form} 18 "If a document filed within the time 
specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3," the Court concluded, 
"it is effective as a notice of appeal. " 119 
A striking feature of the Court's analysis in Smith was its express affirmation 
of the Torres Court's understanding ofRule 3( c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Noting that the "principle ofliberal construction" allowing a court of appeals to 
regard a document as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal does not 
excuse noncompliance with Rule 3(c),120 the Court made clear that "Rule 3's 
dictates are jurisdictional in nature, and their satisfaction is a prerequisite to 
appellate review." 121 "Although courts should construe Rule 3 liberally when 
determining whether it has been complied with," the Court continued, 
"noncompliance is fatal to an appeal."122 
Applying these principles to the circumstances before it, the Court held that 
the content of Smith's briefing form would determine the Fourth Circuit's 
jurisdiction over his appeal. 123 In particular, the Court observed that the 
appellees had challenged the validity of Smith's briefing form as a notice of 
appeal on the basis that it failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 3( c). 124 
117. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248. 
118. /d. 
119. I d. at 248-49 (stating further that the Federal Rules "do not preclude an appellate court 
from treating a filing styled as a brief as a notice of appeal ... if the filing is timely under Rule 4 
and conveys the information required by Rule 3(c)"). 
120. ld. at 248. 
121. ld. (citing Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1988)). In 
determining whether a specific document qualifies as the "functional equivalent" of a notice of 
appeal, some courts of appeals have been more careful than others to ensure that the document 
satisfies Rule 3(c)'s requirements. Compare Campiti, 333 F.3d at 320 ("Admittedly, the 
document does not specify the judgment appealed from or the appellate court; but here, where 
no doubt exists as to either, Rule 3 buttressed by latitude for a pro se litigant forgives these 
'informalit[ies] of form.'" (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4)) (alteration in original)), with 
Andrade v. Att'yGen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 538 
U.S. 63 (2003) ("Andrade's motion for extension oftime satisfied the three notice requirements 
of Rule 3(c)(l): it identified the judgment at issue, it specified the court to which the appeal 
would be taken, and it was delivered to both the district court and the opposing party."). 
122. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248. 
123. Id. at 249. 
124. /d. at 250 (noting the respondents' contention that "Smith's brief is not an adequate 
notice of appeal because it lacks information required by Rule 3(c)"). 
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Because the Fourth Circuit had not addressed that issue, opting instead to 
dismiss the appeal on the ground that Smith's briefing form could not serve as 
the "functional equivalent" of a notice of appeal, the Court directed the Fourth 
Circuit to ''undertake the appropriate analysis" on rernand. 125 
Almost ten years after Smith, the Supreme Court again affirmed the Torres 
Court's jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c) in Becker v. Montgomery. 126 
Dale Becker, acting prose, brought an action to recover for alleged exposure to 
second-hand smoke while incarcerated in an Ohio prison. 127 After the district 
court dismissed his complaint, Becker filed a notice of appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.128 Although the notice fulfilled the requirements 
of Rule 3(c),129 Becker typed his name "[o]n the line tagged '(Counsel for 
Appellant)'" instead of signing it by hand. 130 The Sixth Circuit concluded that 
the notice's lack of a handwritten signature violated Rule 11(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and on that basis dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 131 
In the Supreme Court's view, the Sixth Circuit had correctly concluded that 
Rule 11 (a) obligated Becker to hand-sign his notice of appeal. 132 The Court thus 
125. !d. On remand, the appellees asserted that Smith had failed to comply with Rule 3(c)'s 
judgment-designation requirement because his briefing form simply sought"[ a] new trial on all 
issues triable by Jury." Smith v. Barry, 985 F.2d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 1993) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotations omitted). The Fourth Circuit agreed with the appellees' position 
to the extent that Smith sought to appeal from the district court's pretrial dismissal of one of the 
defendants. /d. at 184 ("Dr. Barry's dismissal was not an issue triable by jury."). However, 
regarding Smith's effort to appeal from the district court's entry of a directed verdict in favor 
of six other defendants at the close of Smith's case, the Fourth Circuit construed the form as 
containing the "functional equivalent of the specifications required by Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3(c)" because the claim in question "went to trial before a jury." /d. 
126. 532 u.s. 757 (2001). 
127. /d. at 760. 
128. /d. at 760-61. 
129. /d. ("Using a notice of appeal form printed by the Government Printing Office, Becker 
filled in the blanks, specifying himself as sole appellant, designating the judgment from which 
he appealed, and naming the court to which he appealed." (citing FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l))). 
130. /d. at 759-60. 
131. !d. at760-61. Seegenera//yFED.R.Crv.P.ll(a)("Everypleading, written motion, and 
other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, 
or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party." (emphasis 
added)). In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit relied upon its previous decision in Mattingly v. Farmers 
State Bank, 153 F.3d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that the court lacked 
jurisdiction over the appeal because "[t]he notice of appeal was not signed, [and] the omission 
was not corrected within the 30-day appeal period of Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(l)"). 
132. See Becker, 532 U.S. at 764 ("As Rule ll(a) is now framed, we read the requirement 
of a signature to indicate, as a signature requirement commonly does, and as it did in John 
Hancock's day, a name handwritten (or a mark handplaced)."). 
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rejected Becker's contention that the appearance ofhis name in typewritten form 
on the notice was sufficient. 133 The Court was satisfied, however, that such a 
notice could withstand a violation of Rule ll(a)'s signature requirement "so 
long as the appellant promptly supplies the signature once the omission is called 
to his attention."134 Because Becker eventually proffered a duplicate notice of 
appeal containing the requisite handwritten signature, the Court concluded that 
the Sixth Circuit had improperly dismissed his appeal for lack ofjurisdiction. 135 
In so holding, the Court expressly affirmed the Torres Court's conception of 
Rule 3( c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite. 136 The Court distinguished 
Rule 11 (a)'s signature requirement from the content and timing requirements 
contained in Rule 3 and Rule 4, respectively, 137 emphasizing that the latter two 
"are indeed linked jurisdictional provisions."138 Observing that the signature 
requirement derives from Rule ll(a) as opposed to Rule 3(c), the Court 
determined that Rule 11(a) "alone calls for and controls that requirement and 
renders it nonjurisdictional."139 
2. The Response of the Advisory Committee 
In the wake of Torres, the courts of appeals began to demand meticulous 
compliance with Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement. 140 Given the 
Torres Court's characterization of the phrase "et al." as a "vague designation" 
that "utterly fails" to provide the requisite notice to the intended recipients, 141 a 
133. See id. at 763. 
134. /d. at 760. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(a) ("An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless 
omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney 
or party."). 
135. Becker, 532 U.S. at 765. 
136. /d. 
137. /d. at 765-66. 
138. /d. at 765 (emphasis added); see Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,315 
( 1988) ("This admonition by the Advisory Committee makes no distinction among the various 
requirements of Rule 3 and Rule 4; rather, it treats the requirements of the two Rules as a single 
jurisdictional threshold."). 
139. /d. at 766; see also 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[3][b][i] ("[S]ince a 
signature is not one of the jurisdictional requirements of Appellate Rule 3, but rather a 
non jurisdictional requirement of Civil Rule ll, the omission of a signature from a notice of 
appeal does not deprive the circuit court of appellate jurisdiction."). 
140. See, e.g., Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177 
(7th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (stating that "[Torres] requires us to insist on punctilious, literal, 
and exact compliance" with Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement). For additional 
discussion of post-Torres decisions applying Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement, see 
Gegenheimer, supra note 77, at 732-41. See also Servay, supra note 77, at 591-92 nn.38-39 
(collecting cases). 
141. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318. 
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notice of appeal's inclusion of "et al." usually provided no recourse to a 
prospective appellant whose name was not otherwise specified in the notice. 142 
Nor could such a party, in the view of most courts of appeals, be effectively 
specified by a notice's use of a plural generic term such as "plaintiffs" or 
"defendants. " 143 What is more, some courts held that the specification of a party 
142. See, e.g., Regalado v. City of Commerce City, 20 F.3d 1104, ll06 (lOth Cir. 1994); 
Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (4th Cir. 1993); Moore v. Warehouse Club, 
Inc., 992 F.2d 27,28 n.l (3d Cir. 1993); Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d 237, 240-43 (5th 
Cir. 1993); Gen. E1ec. Co. v. Lehnen, 974 F.2d 66, 67 (8th Cir. 1992); Adkins v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 968 F.2d 1317, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Ooleyv. Schwitzer Div., 961 F.2d 1293, 
1305-06 (7th Cir. 1992); Buck v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 960 F.2d 603, 603 n.l (6th Cir. 1992); 
Walter v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Pension Fund, 949 F.2d 310, 312 (lOth Cir. 1991); 
Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d l 04, 108-09 (l st Cir. 1991 ); Worlds v. Dep't ofHealth and Rehab. 
Servs., Fla., 929 F.2d 591,592-93 (ll th Cir.l99l)(percuriam); United States v. Tucson Mech. 
Contracting, Inc., 921 F.2d 911,913-14 (9th Cir. 1990); Baylis v. Marriot Corp., 906 F.2d 874, 
877 (2d Cir. 1990); Baucher v. E. Ind. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 906 F.2d 332, 333-34 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's determination that the use of"et a!." in a notice of 
appeal failed to satisfy Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement, several courts of appeals 
recognized particular situations in which the phrase would suffice. For example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, in a case involving only two parties with standing to 
appeal, the inclusion of"et a!." would specify the unnamed party. See, e.g., Pope v. Miss. Real 
Estate Comm'n, 872 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Moreover, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the inclusion of "et a!." as sufficient to satisfy the 
party-specification requirement when the body of the notice of appeal also contained a plural 
generic term such as "plaintiffs" or "defendants." See, e.g., Benally v. Hodel, 940 F.2d 1194, 
1197 (9th Cir. 1990). On occasion, the court found that the plural generic term sufficed on its 
own. See, e.g., Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991). 
Interestingly, although "et al." typically was not an effective means of specifying a party 
whose name did not otherwise appear in a notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit held that the use of the Latin phrase "et ux." (meaning "and wife") immediately after a 
litigant's name was sufficient to specify his wife. Milanovich v. Costa Crociere, 938 F.2d 297, 
298 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The court reasoned that, while "et al." might refer to "an 
entire class of unnamed individuals or just to some members of that class," the phrase "et ux." 
could refer only to the wife of the specified appellant. /d. 
143. See, e.g., Mal/as, 993 F.2dat 1116-17; Colle, 981 F.2dat242;Lehnen, 974 F.2d at67; 
Adkins, 968 F.2d at 1319; Pontarelli, 930 F.2d at 108-09; Prattv. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt., Inc. 
Employee Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651,654-55 (lOth Cir. 1990); Pride v. Venango River 
Corp., 916 F.2d 1250, 1251-53 (7th Cir. 1990); Minority Employees ofthe Tenn. Dep't of 
Employment Sec., Inc. v. Tenn. Dep't of Employment Sec., 901 F.2d 1327, 1332 (6th Cir. 
1990) (en bane). 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit went so far as to conclude that the use of terms 
such as "all plaintiffs" or "all defendants" in a notice of appeal was not sufficient to satisfy the 
party-specification requirement. See Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d 174, 175-76 
(l st Cir. 1988). 
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was valid only when appearing in the body of a notice of appeal, as opposed to 
its caption. 144 
The post-Torres insistence upon scrupulous compliance with Rule 3(c)'s 
party-specification requirement posed particular problems for litigants who 
sought to appeal on behalf of other parties in addition to themselves. In the 
context of a class action (or putative class action), most courts of appeals did not 
consider a notice of appeal's specification of a class representative, without 
some mention of the representative's status, as encompassing the class 
members. 145 Moreover, a notice's specification of one litigant typically was not 
regarded as a sufficient means of specifying members of that litigant's family as 
well. 146 
In an effort to relax some of the exacting standards of compliance that many 
courts of appeals had begun to enforce after Torres, the Advisory Committee on 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure crafted a series of amendments to 
Rule 3( c), which took effect in December 1993.147 Under the Rule as amended, 
an attorney representing various parties in a case could specify each of them 
using the phrase "et al.," or with a plural generic term such as "the defendants" 
or "all plaintiffs."148 The amended Rule also provided that the inclusion of the 
144. See, e.g., All Pac. Trading, Inc. v. Vessel MN Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th 
Cir. 1993); Allen Archery, 851 F.2d at 1177. But see James v. United States, 970 F.2d 750, 752 
n.3 (lOth Cir. 1992) (referring to the caption in determining whether the party-specification 
requirement had been met); Samaad v. City of Dallas, 922 F .2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); 
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 913 F.2d 419,423-24 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); In 
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 875 F.2d 927, 931 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). 
145. See, e.g., Griffith v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 25,27 (1st Cir. 1993); Hammon v. Kelly, 980 
F.2d 785, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Ooley, 961 F.2d at 1305-06; Reed v. Int'l Union ofUnited 
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 945 F.2d 198, 199 n.l (7th Cir. 1991). 
But see Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1061 n.l (2d Cir. 1989) (amended 
complaint's listing of all plaintiffs as "representatives ofthe plaintiff class" specified the class 
members by implication in the notice of appeal); Rendon v. AT&T Techs., 883 F.2d 388, 398 
n.8 (5th Cir.l989) (inclusion of"et al." immediately after the name of the class representatives 
specified the remaining members of that class). 
146. See, e.g., Regalado, 20 F.3d at 1106; Buck, 960 F.2d at 603 n.l. Contra Colle, 981 
F.2d at 241 (notice of appeal's specification of a parent encompasses a child on whose behalf 
the parent sues). 
147. For a critical assessment of these amendments, see Servay, supra note 77, at 593-97. 
See generally FED. R.APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments). Many courts 
of appeals retroactively applied these amendments in order to sustain appellate jurisdiction over 
litigants who otherwise would not have satisfied the party-specification requirement after 
Torres. E.g., Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Frey v. City of 
Herculaneum, 44F.3d 667,670 n.l (8th Cir. 1995); Cleveland v. PorcaCo., 38 F.3d 289,293-
94 (7th Cir. 1994); Dodger's Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 32 
F.3d 1436, 1440-41 (lOth Cir. 1994); Garcia v. Wash, 20 F.3d 608,609-10 (5th Cir. 1994). 
148. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(A) (stating that the party-specification requirement is satisfied 
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party's name solely in the notice's caption would suffice. 149 It follows that, had 
these amendments been in force at the time of Torres, the notice of appeal at 
issue in that matter would have effectively specified Jose Torres despite its 
failure to list his name in the body. 150 
The amended rule also makes clear that, in certain instances, the specification 
of one party in a notice of appeal will specify other related parties whose names 
did not otherwise appear in a notice of appeal. In particular, a notice's 
specification of a single class representative in the context of a class action -
or putative class action- encompasses each member of the pertinent class. 151 
Moreover, the specification of a party who proceeds pro se presumptively 
encompasses his or her spouse and minor children. 152 
when "an attorney representing more than one party ... describe[s] those parties with such 
terms as 'all plaintiffs,' 'the defendants,' 'the plaintiffs A, B, et al.,' or 'all defendants except 
X"'); see also id. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments) (stating that "in order 
to prevent the loss of a right to appeal through inadvertent omission of a party's name or 
continued use of such terms as 'et al.,' which are sufficient in all district court filings after the 
complaint, the amendment allows an attorney representing more than one party the flexibility 
to indicate which parties are appealing without naming them individually"). 
Despite this amendment, a notice of appeal's use of a plural generic term will not necessarily 
suffice to specify the pertinent individual parties. For example, the First Circuit has held that 
a notice of appeal referencing "the consolidated plaintiffs" did not specify the individual parties 
who made up that group because the notice was filed by an attorney who did not represent them. 
See Schneider v. Colegio deAbogados de P.R., 187 F.3d 30, 58-59 & n.48 (1st Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam). 
149. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(A) (stating that the party-specification requirement is satisfied 
"by naming each [party] in the caption or body of the notice"). See, e.g., Spain v. Bd. ofEduc. 
of Meridian Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 101, 214 F.3d 925, 929 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying upon 
Rule 3( c)( I )(A) in concluding that the party-specification requirement was satisfied even though 
the appellant's name appeared in the caption, but not in the body, of the notice of appeal). 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
151. FED. R. APP. P. 3( c )(3) ("In a class action, whether or not the class has been certified, 
the notice of appeal is sufficient if it names one person qualified to bring the appeal as 
representative of the class."); see id. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments). 
Although this amendment has facilitated compliance with the party-specification 
requirement in class actions, there is still room for error. In particular, the Seventh Circuit has 
held that a notice of appeal will specify an entire class (or putative class) of individuals only if 
it specifies at least one individual qualified to appeal on behalf of that class, see Clay v. Fort 
Wayne Cmty. Schs., 76 F.3d 873, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1996), and expressly states that the 
individual in question is appealing as a class representative, see Murphy v. Keystone Steel & 
Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 569-71 (7th Cir. 1995). 
152. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(2)("A prose notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the 
signer and the signer's spouse and minor children (if they are parties), unless the notice clearly 
indicates otherwise."); see id. 3( c) advisory committee's note ( 1993 Amendments); see also Ms. 
S. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.l5 (9th Cir. 2003) (relying upon 
Rule 3(c)(2) in concluding that the notice of appeal's specification as a prose appellant also 
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Lastly, Rule 3(c)'s provision that "[a]n appeal must not be dismissed for 
informality ofform or title of the notice,"153 which the Torres Court had rejected 
as a basis to save Jose Torres's appeal! 54 was amended to add the clause "or for 
failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the 
notice."ISS Elaborating upon this latter amendment in the accompanying notes, 
the Advisory Committee explained that "[i]f a court determines it is objectively 
clear that a party intended to appeal, there are neither administrative concerns 
nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal from going forward."156 
Significantly, the preceding amendments to Rule 3(c), which constitute the 
entirety of the Advisory Committee's response to Torres, did not in any manner 
question or challenge the Torres Court's conception of Rule 3(c) as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite. 157 A review of the text of the amendments, along 
with the committee's accompanying notes, makes plain that the committee's 
exclusive objective was to facilitate compliance with Rule 3(c)'s party-
specification requirement. 158 Considering that the Torres Court's jurisdictional 
understanding of Rule 3( c) was informed in part by its view that the Advisory 
Committee itself had a jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3( c), 159 the 
committee's tacit acceptance of that understanding strongly suggests that it 
approved of the Torres Court's approach. 
D. The Affirmation ofFoman Too? 
The Torres Court's jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3( c)'s requirements 
would appear to be firmly established, given its explicit affirmation in both 
Smith and Becker, and its implicit affirmation by the silence of the Advisory 
Committee. On two occasions since Torres, however, the Court has cited 
encompassed her daughter). 
153. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4). 
154. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
155. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4). 
156. /d. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments). 
157. See 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[3][a][ii] (noting that ''the 1993 
amendment does not alter that part of the To"es decision that held that the specification 
requirements of Appellate Rule 3 are jurisdictional; it simply made the requirements easier to 
meet"); Servay, supra note 77, at 594 ("Importantly, while the amendments to Rule 3(c) make 
adjustments in what constitutes compliance with this requirement, nothing in [the] amendments 
or in the advisory committee notes suggest [sic] that the new rule is any less jurisdictional. 
Thus, the most important part of the To"es ruling- that appeals must be dismissed for lack 
ofjurisdiction where a party fails to comply with the requirements of the rule- has not been 
overruled."). 
158. See Servay, supra note 77, at 594 (observing that the 1993 amendments "dealt only 
with one of the three requirements of Rule 3( c) - that the notice of appeal name the party or 
parties appealing"). 
159. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
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Foman in connection with propositions that simply cannot be reconciled with 
that understanding. These references suggest that the Court is not yet prepared 
to abandon a more forgiving approach toward noncompliance with the content 
requirements of a notice of appeal than a jurisdictional conception of Rule 3( c) 
would permit. 
The first such reference to Foman occurred in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. 
Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 160 which the Court decided only three years 
after Torres. FirsTier involved insurance policies that FirsTier Mortgage Co. 
had procured from Investors Mortgage Insurance Co. to protect against the risk 
of default on a set of eight real-estate loans.161 FirsTier brought suit against 
Investors when, after each of the eight borrowers defaulted on the insured loans, 
Investors refused to pay FirsTier the policy proceeds. 162 At the conclusion of 
oral argument on Investors' motion for summary judgment, the district court 
advised the litigants of its intention to grant the motion on the basis that 
FirsTier's fraud or bad faith in procuring the policies had voided them. 163 
FirsTier filed a notice of appeal from the district court's bench ruling several 
weeks later. 164 The district court did not enter a judgment encapsulating that 
ruling, however, until almost one month after FirsTier filed its notice of 
appeal. 165 The issue then became whether FirsTier's notice remained effective 
to appeal from the judgment that the district court subsequently entered.166 The 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the notice was fatally 
premature, and dismissed FirsTier's appeal accordingly. 167 
In reversing the Tenth Circuit's conclusion, the Supreme Court focused upon 
the relation-forward provision ofRule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which provided that "a notice of appeal filed after the announcement 
of a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order shall be 
treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof."168 According to the 
Court, "Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to 
operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a district court 
160. 498 u.s. 269 (1991). 
161. /d. at 270. 
162. /d. 
163. /d. at 270-71. 
164. /d. at 272. 
165. /d. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 1993). The substance of the 
current version of Rule 4(a)(2) is virtually the same, with only minor stylistic changes. See 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2) ("A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order 
but before the entry of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after the 
entry."). 
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announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the 
entry of judgment."169 The Court was confident that, in such instances, "a 
litigant's confusion is understandable, and permitting the notice of appeal to 
become effective when judgment is entered does not catch the appellee by 
surprise."170 Accordingly, "(l]ittle would be accomplished by prohibiting the 
court of appeals from reaching the merits of such an appeal." 171 
Regarding the matter before it, the Court was satisfied that FirsTier's notice 
of appeal from the district court's bench ruling was effective to appeal from its 
summary judgment in favor oflnvestors. 172 Assuming arguendo that the bench 
ruling was not final because the district court could have changed course before 
entering judgment, the Court noted that the bench ruling "did announce a 
decision purporting to dispose of all ofFirsTier's claims."173 If the district court 
had entered judgment immediately following the bench ruling, the Court 
continued, the bench ruling undoubtedly would have constituted a "final 
decision" within the meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1291}74 Under the circumstances, 
the Court found that FirsTier's belief in the finality of the bench ruling was 
reasonable, and thus its premature notice of appeal was effective to appeal from 
the judgment that the district court ultimately entered. 175 
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the Court felt obliged to reconcile its 
determination concerning the effectiveness of FirsTier's premature notice of 
appeal with Rule 3( c)'s judgment-designation requirement. 176 Presumably, the 
Court was concerned that its ruling would permit FirsTier to appeal from the 
district court's judgment even though Firs Tier mentioned only the bench ruling 
in its notice of appeal. The Court appealed to Foman in this regard, 
characterizing that case as establishing that "a notice of appeal that designates 
a postjudgment motion should be treated as noting an appeal from the final 
judgment when the appellant's intention to appeal the fmal judgment is 
sufficiently 'manifest' that the appellee is not misled."177 Applying this 
principle to the Rule 4(a)(2) context, the Court stated that a notice of appeal 
from a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry 
of judgment, such as the district court's bench ruling in favor of Investors, 
169. FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 276. 
170. !d. 
171. !d. 
172. !d. at 277. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)(granting the courts of appeals jurisdiction 
over "appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States"). 
175. Firs Tier, 498 U.S. at 277. 
176. !d. at 276-77. See generally FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (mandating that a notice of 
appeal "designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed"). 
177. FirsTier,498U.S.at276n.6(citingFomanv.Davis,371 U.S.178, 181 (1962)). 
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"sufficiently manifests an intent to appeal from the final judgment for purposes 
ofRule 3(c)."178 
Although the FirsTier Court offered an acceptable statement of the Foman 
holding, its application of Foman to the Rule 4(a)(2) context is utterly 
inconsistent with the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c)'s reach in Torres 
only three years earlier. Indeed, in rejecting the position that the courts of 
appeals should review violations of Rule 3(c) for harmless error, the Torres 
Court emphasized that "a litigant's failure to clear a jurisdictional hurdle can 
never be 'harmless' or waived by a court."179 Under Torres, therefore, a court 
of appeals simply lacks the authority to pardon a notice of appeal's failure to 
designate a ruling pursuant to Rule 3(c)'s judgment-designation requirement, 
even if the appellant's intention to appeal from that ruling was sufficiently 
manifest that the appellee was not misled. Accordingly, the FirsTier Court's 
favorable reference to Foman, not to mention its application of Foman to the 
Rule 4(a)(2) context, suggests that Rule 3(c)'s judgment-designation 
requirement is not entirely jurisdictional in nature after all. 
The second instance in which the Court cited Foman in a manner that 
contravened the Torres Court's jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c)'s 
requirements was, oddly enough, in Becker. As discussed earlier, Becker 
explicitly recognized a conception of Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite 
in distinguishing Rule 11 (a)'s signature requirement from the content and timing 
requirements of Rules 3(c) and 4, respectively. 180 Toward the close of its 
opinion, however, the Court gratuitously observed that, unlike in Torres, the 
matter before it did not involve a notice of appeal that failed to satisfy 
Rule 3( c)'s party-specification requirement. 181 The Court then stated, even more 
gratuitously, that "[o]ther opinions of this Court are in full harmony with the 
view that imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal when no 
genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which 
appellate court," and cited both Smith and Foman in support of the statement. 182 
178. /d. at 277 n.6. 
179. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 n.3 (1988). 
180. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
181. Beckerv. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757,767 (2001). 
182. /d. (citing Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244,245 (1992); Foman, 371 U.S. at 181). The 
Court recently reitemted this exact quotation, complete with the references to Smith and Foman, 
in Scarborough v. Principi: 
Permitting a late signature to perfect an appeal, we explained, was hardly 
path breaking, for"[ o ]ther opinions of this Court are in full harmony with the view 
that imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine 
doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate 
court." 
541 U.S. 401, 416 (2004)(altemtion in original) (quoting Becker, 532 U.S. at 767-768 (citing 
300 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:271 
In so doing, the Court parenthetically described Foman as holding that "an 
appeal was improperly dismissed when the record as a whole - including a 
timely but incomplete notice of appeal and a premature but complete notice-
revealed the orders [Foman] sought to appeal."183 
Although the statement that "imperfections in noticing an appeal should not 
be fatal when no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what 
judgment, to which appellate court"184 is relatively innocuous when reviewed in 
isolation, 185 it becomes quite troubling when considered in combination with its 
reference to Foman. Notably, the statement failed to make clear that the notice 
of appeal itself must convey "who is appealing, from what judgment, to which 
appellate court,"186 as Rule 3( c) would demand. 187 The statement's failure in this 
respect created an ambiguity regarding whether a submission other than a notice 
of appeal may properly convey that information. But the Court then effectively 
resolved that ambiguity with its citation of Foman and corresponding 
description ofF oman as holding that "an appeal was improperly dismissed when 
Smith, 502 U.S. at 245, 248-49; Foman, 371 U.S. at 181)). At issue in Scarborough was 
whether a litigant may amend a timely application for an award of fees under the Equal Justice 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (2000) (authorizing an award offees to a prevailing party in an 
action against the United States), after expiration of the thirty-day filing period, in order to cure 
an initial failure to allege that the government's position in the underlying litigation was not 
"substantially justified" within the meaning of§ 2412(d)(1)(A). Scarborough, 541 U.S. at418-
19. The Court's conclusion that such an amendment was permissible was informed in part by 
its determination in Becker that Rule 11(a)'s signature requirement is not jurisdictional in 
nature. /d. at 419 ("Just as failure initially to verify a charge or sign a 'pleading, written motion, 
[or] other paper,' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(a), was not fatal to the petitioners' cases in Edelman 
and Becker, so here, counsel's initial omission of the assertion that the Government's position 
lacked substantial justification is not beyond repair." (alteration in original)). 
183. Becker, 532 U.S. at 768. 
184. /d. at 767. 
185. Indeed, the Court has never insisted upon "perfect" compliance with Rule 3(c)'s 
requirements. Even Torres and Smith, both of which emphasized that those requirements are 
jurisdictional in nature, made clear that the courts of appeals are to construe them "liberally." 
Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (instructing that "courts should construe Rule 3 liberally when 
determining whether it has been complied with"); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 
312, 316 (1988) (instructing that "the requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally 
construed"). Moreover, Smith arguably tolerates "imperfections in noticing an appeal" to the 
extent that it allows virtually any document that satisfies the applicable timing and content 
requirements to serve as the "functional equivalent" of a notice of appeal. Smith, 502 U.S. at 
248-49 ("If a document filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by 
Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal."). 
186. Becker, 532 U.S. at 767. 
187. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1) ("The notice of appeal must: (A) specify the party or parties 
taking the appeal ... ; (B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed; and 
(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken." (emphasis added)). 
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the record as a whole - including a timely but incomplete notice of appeal and 
a premature but complete notice - revealed the orders petitioner sought to 
appeal."188 In effect, the Court's point was that the process of determining 
whether "no genuine doubt exists as to who is appealing, from what judgment, 
to which appellate court" requires consideration not just of the four corners of 
a notice of appeal, but of the entire record in the case. 189 
Understood in this light, the statement of the Becker Court at issue cannot be 
reconciled with the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3( c) that the Becker Court 
elsewhere embraces in the same opinion. 190 As noted previously, in rejecting the 
position that the courts of appeals should review violations of Rule 3(c) for 
harmless error, the Torres Court emphasized that "a litigant's failure to clear a 
jurisdictional hurdle can never be 'harmless' or waived by a court."191 Under 
Torres, therefore, a court of appeals would simply lack the authority to excuse 
a notice of appeal's failure to comply with any of the dictates of Rule 3( c), even 
if, after a review of the record as a whole, "no genuine doubt exist[ ed] about 
who is appealing, from what judgment, to which appellate court."192 
Accordingly, the Becker Court's contrary insinuation further suggests that 
Rule 3(c)'s requirements are not entirely jurisdictional in nature after all. 
III. The Disordered Enforcement of Rule 3(c) in the Courts of Appeals 
As the preceding section demonstrates, the Supreme Court's direction 
concerning the content requirements of a notice of appeal has been anything but 
methodical. In Foman, the Court regarded an act of noncompliance with those 
requirements as a "mere technicality" that could be easily pardoned when the 
appellee was neither prejudiced nor misled by the violation. 193 In the subsequent 
case of Torres, the Court arrived at a jurisdictional understanding ofthose same 
requirements, and thus noncompliance would dictate dismissal of the appeal 
regardless of whether the violation was prejudicial or misleading to the 
appellee. 194 Rather than overrule F oman as irreconcilable with this jurisdictional 
understanding of Rule 3(c), however, the Court distinguished Foman on an 
unconvincing basis. Even more troubling, the Court's affirmation of the Torres 
Court's jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c) in Smith and Becker, not to 
mention the implicit acceptance of that understanding by the Advisory 
188. Becker, 532 U.S. at 768. 
189. See id. at 767-68. 
190. See id. at 765 (stating that "Appellate Rules 3 and 4 are indeed 1ink.edjurisdictional 
provisions" (emphasis added)). 
191. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 n.3 (1988). 
192. Becker, 532 U.S. at 767. 
193. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962). 
194. See To"es, 487 U.S. at 315-17. 
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Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, has been countered by 
the Court's affirmation of the approach in Foman in both FirsTier and Becker. 
Not surprisingly, the enforcement of Rule 3(c)'s requirements among the 
courts of appeals has become a rather disordered affair. When confronted with 
a notice of appeal that contravenes a requirement ofRule 3( c), a court of appeals 
may take the hard line and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and rely 
upon Torres for support. If in a more magnanimous frame of mind, the court 
can rely upon Foman to excuse the violation on the basis that the defect did not 
prejudice or mislead the appellee. Or, if it wishes to act in the forgiving 
tradition of Foman while respecting the jurisdictional conception of Rule 3(c) 
adopted in Torres, the court might sustain an appeal initiated by a defective 
notice of appeal simply by determining, through a distorted construction of the 
pertinent requirement of Rule 3(c), that the requirement had not been violated 
at all. 
The following discussion, which involves an assessment of decisions 
rendered since Torres, reveals the extent to which the courts of appeals- and 
sometimes the same court of appeals- have taken all of the above approaches 
with regard to each of Rule 3(c)'s requirements. 
A. The Party-Specification Requirement 
As observed earlier, the exacting compliance that the courts of appeals had 
demanded in the wake of Torres regarding Rule 3(c)'s party-specification 
requirement led to a series of amendments designed to facilitate compliance with 
that requirement.195 By no means, however, did those amendments eliminate the 
general requirement that a notice of appeal "specify the party or parties taking 
the appeal."196 Moreover, those amendments in no way undermined the Torres 
Court's jurisdictional conception of Rule 3( c)'s requirements. 197 Accordingly, 
despite the liberalizing effect of the amendments, litigants have frequently lost 
the opportunity to appeal solely because they contravened the party-specification 
requirement. 198 
195. See supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text. 
196. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(A). 
197. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
198. See, e.g., United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 427 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2005); Reed v. 
Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 2003); Meehan v. United Consumers Club 
Franchising Corp., 312 F.3d 909,911 (8th Cir. 2002); Corroon v. Reeve, 258 F.3d 86,91-92 
(2d Cir. 2001 ); Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F .3d 786, 788 (8th Cir. 2001 ); Twenty 
Mile Joint Venture, PND, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 200 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (lOth Cir. 1999); Bogle v. 
Orange County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 F.3d 653, 660-61 (11th Cir. 1998); Maerki v. 
Wilson, 128 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 1997); Billino v. Citibank, N.A., 123 F.3d 723,725-
26 (2d Cir. 1997); Agee v. Paramount Commc'ns lnc., 114 F.3d 395,399-400 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Bailey v. U.S. Dep't of Army Corps of Eng'rs, 35 F.3d 1118, 1119 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); 
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Such a lost opportunity occurred in the Tenth Circuit in Twenty Mile Joint 
Venture, PND, Ltd v. Commissioner. 199 Twenty Mile involved an effort by 
Twenty Mile Joint Venture (Twenty Mile) and Parker Properties Joint Venture 
(Parker Properties) to challenge a ruling of the United States Tax Court in favor 
of the Commissioner oflntemal Revenue (the Commissioner).200 The operative 
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, 
specified no party other than Twenty Mile.201 Finding "no mention of Parker 
Properties whatsoever" in the notice, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal of 
Parker Properties for lack of jurisdiction. 202 
In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated a splendid understanding ofboth 
the rationale of Torres and the impact of the 1993 amendments to Rule 3( c). 
First, the court appropriately discounted the significance of any prejudice that 
the Commissioner may have suffered as a result ofParker Properties' failure to 
comply with Rule 3( c)'s party-specification requirement. 203 The court supported 
its view by reference to a prior decision acknowledging the Torres Court's 
determination that, in light ofRule 3( c)'s jurisdictional nature, a violation of one 
of its requirements is not subject to review for harmless error.204 Second, the 
Tenth Circuit properly rejected Parker Properties' contention that the 1993 
amendments to Rule 3(c) had the effect of overruling Torres. 205 While 
recognizing that "the amended rule provides somewhat more flexibility than the 
language in effect when Torres was decided," the court emphasized that the rule 
"still requires that the notice of appeal make clear in some fashion the identity 
of each party desiring to join the appeal."206 
Notwithstanding its faithful application of Torres in Twenty Mile, the Tenth 
Circuit had employed a rather different approach when confronted with a 
Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472,474 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 ( 1996), as recognized 
in Miller v. Comm'r, 310 F.3d 640, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002). 
199. 200 F.3d 1268. 
200. Under Rule 13(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(c) governs the 
content of a notice of appeal filed with the Tax Court. See FED. R. APP. P. 13(c) ("Rule 3 
prescribes the contents of a notice of appeal, the manner of service, and the effect of its filing 
and service."); see also id. ("Form 2 in the Appendix ofF orrns is a suggested form of a notice 
of appeal."); id. app., form 2 (Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals from a Decision of the 
United States Tax Court). 
201. Twenty Mile, 200 F.3d at 1273-74. 
202. Id. at 1274. 
203. I d. ("The fact that the Commissioner may have suffered no prejudice is not dispositive 
here."). 
204. /d. (citing In re Woosley, 855 F.2d 687,688 (lOth Cir. 1988)); see also supra note 88 
and accompanying text. 
205. Twenty Mile, 200 F.3d at 1274. 
206. /d. 
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violation of Rule 3( c)'s party-specification requirement just three years earlier. 
In Grimsley v. MacKay/01 the court sustained the appeals of several parties who, 
by the court's own admission, had not been specified in the operative notice of 
appeal. 208 In refusing to dismiss those appeals, the court referred to a docketing 
statement that the parties had submitted several weeks after the filing of the 
notice.209 The court observed that the docketing statement contained the names 
of the parties in question, "leaving no doubt as to which parties intended to 
appeal and curing the defect in the notice of appeal."210 Accordingly, the court 
was satisfied with its jurisdiction over the appeals of those parties.211 
The response of the Tenth Circuit in Grimsley to an obvious violation of 
Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement demonstrates that the court was 
operating outside of the Torres framework. Had Torres governed, the court's 
recognition that the parties in question had not been specified in the notice of 
appeal, in and of itself, would have compelled a dismissal of those appeals for 
want of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit, however, perceived the defect in the 
notice at issue not as a jurisdictional barrier, but as a defect subject to cure 
depending upon the content of other submissions in the record. 
Such an approach, while contrary to Torres, falls squarely within the 
forgiving tradition established in Foman. In the same manner that the Foman 
Court excused an obvious violation of the judgment-designation requirement 
upon determining that the appellant had conveyed an intent to appeal from the 
decision in question through other submissions in the record,212 the Tenth Circuit 
in Grimsley excused an obvious violation of the party-specification requirement 
upon determining that the parties in question had conveyed an intent to appeal 
through the docketing statement. In light of that intent, the Tenth Circuit's 
implicit conclusion was that the defect in the notice did not mislead or prejudice 
the appellee,213 which warranted the exercise of jurisdiction over appeals that 
would have been readily dismissed under Torres.214 
207. 93 F.3d 676 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
208. /d. at 678. 
209. /d. 
210. /d. 
211. /d. 
212. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
213. See supra text accompanying note 51. 
214. This is not to say that the Tenth Circuit was wrong to consider the docketing statement 
in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over those parties who had not been specified in the 
initial notice of appeal. As previously noted, the Supreme Court established in Smith that 
virtually any document can qualify as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. See supra 
notes 116-19 and accompanying text. The docketing statement in Grimsley, therefore, might 
have stood on its own as notice of appeal, but only if it satisfied all of the requirements of 
Rule 3(c), not to mention the timing requirements of Rule 4. See supra note 119 and 
2006] RESCUING RULE 3(c) 305 
In addition to considering defects in a notice of appeal as subject to cure by 
other submissions in the record, the Tenth Circuit has sustained appeals 
involving clear violations of Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement by 
distorting the meaning of that requirement in order to determine that there was 
no violation all along. In Laurino v. Tate,215 decided just one year after Twenty 
Mile, the court was presented with a notice of appeal that designated an order 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Thomas McDowell, an attorney who 
represented plaintiff Frederick Laurino. 216 The appellees moved to dismiss the 
appeal from that decision on the basis that the notice did not specify McDowell 
as an appellant, even though he was the sole individual against whom the 
sanctions had been imposed. 217 
The Tenth Circuit ultimately reached the merits of McDowell's appeal, 
notwithstanding its observation that the notice "nowhere mentions Mr. 
McDowell, except for being signed by him as attorney for [Laurino]."218 
Relying upon the 1993 amendment to Rule 3( c)( 4 ), which bars the dismissal of 
an appeal "for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear 
from the notice,"219 the court stressed that the sanctions order designated in the 
notice "only concerns the sanctions entered against Mr. McDowell."220 The 
court thus concluded that the notice's designation of the sanctions order 
"provides sufficient evidence, by implication, ofMr. McDowell's intention to 
take an appeal from [that] order."221 
The fundamental flaw in the Laurino court's approach is that it construes 
Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement out of existence in a significant 
number of cases.222 As observed above, Rule 3(c) unambiguously prescribes 
accompanying text. In Grimsley, however, the court provided no indication that, in addition to 
specifying the parties who were taking the appeal, the docketing statement also designated the 
judgment being appealed or named the court to which the appeal was taken. 
215. 220 F.3d 1213 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
216. /d. at 1218. 
217. /d. 
218. /d. 
219. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(4); see also supra text accompanying notes 153-56. 
220. Laurino, 220 F.3d at 1218. 
221. /d. 
222. In fairness to the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has since adopted the approach 
employed in Laurino. See Retail Flooring Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Beaulieu of Am., LLC, 339 
F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit, relying upon amended 
Rule 3( c)( 4 ), concluded that an attorney who was not listed as an appellant in a notice of appeal 
nonetheless satisfied Rule 3(c)'s party-specification requirement through the designation of the 
order being appealed, considering that the order concerned only that attorney. Id Moreover, 
the Fourth Circuit had employed the same approach even before the operative amendment to 
Rule 3(c)(4) took effect. See Miltier v. Downes, 935 F.2d 660, 663 n.l (4th Cir. 1991). 
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has summarily rejected the notion that amended 
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that a notice of appeal convey three discrete items of information: (1) the party 
or parties who are appealing, (2) the judgment or order (or part thereof) being 
appealed, and (3) the court to which the appeal is taken.223 Under the Tenth 
Circuit's notion that an implicit party specification can result from an explicit 
order designation, however, the court would be constrained to regard a notice of 
appeal containing the name of no party whatsoever as having specified a litigant 
simply because that litigant was the only one with standing to appeal the order 
designated in the notice. As a result, the determination of whether a notice of 
appeal fulfills or flouts the party-specification requirement rests not on an 
objective assessment of the notice's content, but on the number of litigants 
against whom the district court entered the decision being appealed. 
Regrettably, the effect of the Tenth Circuit's ruling would have been exactly the 
same had it announced that, despite the jurisdictional nature of the party-
specification requirement, it would no longer enforce that requirement unless at 
least two parties had standing to appeal from the decision designated in the 
notice. 
Regarding the Tenth Circuit's reliance upon amended Rule 3(c)(4), it must 
be observed that nothing in that provision would permit a court of appeals to 
view a notice of appeal containing the name of no party as having satisfied the 
party-specification requirement. Notably, the provision's prohibition against the 
dismissal of an appeal applies solely to a notice of appeal's "failure to [specify] 
a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice."224 When a 
notice of appeal omits any reference to a litigant as one who is seeking to appeal, 
it is simply not clear from the notice that the litigant intends to appeal,225 
regardless of whether the notice designates an order that concerns no other 
litigant. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's reliance upon amended Rule 3(c)(4) 
was misplaced. 
B. The Judgment-Designation Requirement 
The Tenth Circuit is not the only court of appeals that has experienced 
difficulty in enforcing one ofRule 3( c)'s content requirements with consistency. 
Rule 3( c)( 4) saves an attorney's appeal from a sanctions order (even one that concerns only that 
attorney) when the notice of appeal fails to list that attorney as an appellant. See Reed v. Great 
Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931,933 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Although Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(4) provides that 
an appeal should not be dismissed 'for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is 
otherwise clear from the notice [of appeal),' the lawyer's intent to appeal is not clear from the 
notice of appeal- indeed is not so much as hinted at in it- and as a result we lack jurisdiction 
over her challenge to the sanction that was imposed on her." (alteration in original) (quoting 
Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 F.3d 653, 660 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
223. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l). 
224. /d. 3(c)(4) (emphasis added). 
225. See Reed, 330 F.3d at 933. 
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Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has had similar trouble regarding Rule 3(c)'s 
requirement that a notice of appeal "designate the judgment, order, or part 
thereof being appealed. "226 
One manner in which the Seventh Circuit has responded to violations of the 
judgment-designation requirement is to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the 
nondesignated decision, relying upon the Torres Court's jurisdictional 
understanding of Rule 3(c)'s requirements. The court took this approach in 
Garcia v. City ofChicago,227 in which plaintiff Rafael Garcia brought claims 
against the City of Chicago, among other defendants, arising from an alleged 
beating that he suffered at the hands of a Chicago police officer during an 
arrest. 228 One such claim was that Garcia's rights under the Fourth Amendment 
were violated because he was unable to attend the probable-cause hearing 
conducted the day after his arrest.229 After the district court dismissed that 
claim, Garcia appealed to the Seventh Circuit. His notice of appeal, however, 
did not designate that dismissal as it related to the appellee City of Chicago. 230 
Citing Torres, the court characterized Garcia's failure as "jurisdictional," and 
thus determined that it could not consider that component of Garcia's appeal. 231 
Despite its reliance upon Torres in Garcia, the Seventh Circuit had expressly 
repudiated Torres in favor of Foman when confronted with a violation of the 
judgment-designation requirement just three years earlier, in Cook v. Navis tar 
International Transportation Corp .. 232 In Cook, plaintiffOsie Cook sustained 
injuries while checking the electrical connections of a truck that was designed 
and built by defendant Navistar.233 In addition to Navistar, Cook sued Mid-
Century Insurance Co., an insurer that had issued a worker's-compensation 
policy to Cook's employer.234 
226. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(B). 
227. 24 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1994). 
228. /d. at 968. 
229. /d. at 969. 
230. /d. at 970 n.4. 
231. /d. The Seventh Circuit is not alone in this respect. Other courts of appeals have 
expressly cited Torres in responding to a violation of the judgment-designation requirement by 
dismissing an appeal from a particular decision for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re 
Spookyworld, Inc., 346 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003); Life Plus Int'l v. Brown, 317 F.3d 799, 804-
05 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Glover, 242 F.3d 333,335-37 (6th Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750,756-57 (6th Cir. 1999); Klaudt v. U.S. Dep't of 
Interior, 990 F.2d 409,411 (8th Cir. 1993); Nolan v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 973 F.2d 843,846-
47 (lOth Cir. 1992); Faysound Ltd. v. Falcon Jet Corp., 940 F.2d 339, 342-43 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(per curiam). 
232. 940 F.2d 207, 211 (7th Cir. 1991). 
233. /d. at 208. 
234. /d. at 210. 
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Cook eventually prevailed at trial, and the district court entered judgment 
against Navistar on October 4, 1989.235 The district court did not, however, 
adjudicate Cook's claim against Mid-Century.236 The Seventh Circuit thus 
dismissed Cook's appeal from the October 4 judgment.237 On remand, the 
district court entered a final judgment against Navistar under Rule 54(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on August 29, 1990.238 As for Mid-Century, 
the district court entered a final judgment on September 5, 1990, and then 
entered a modified final judgment on October 12, 1990.239 
Cook subsequently sought to appeal to the Seventh Circuit from the 
August 29 judgment entered under Rule 54(b ).240 Rather than making any 
reference to that judgment, however, Cook's notice of appeal designated only 
the judgments entered on October4, 1989; September 5, 1990; and October 12, 
1990, respectively.241 This posed a problem for Cook because, as the Seventh 
Circuit noted, "[t]he October 4, 1989 'judgment' was invalid, and the other two 
identified judgments dealt solely with Mid-Century."242 Navistar soon seized 
upon the defect in Cook's notice and argued that, under Torres, the court had no 
jurisdiction to review the August 29 judgment in light of Cook's failure to 
comply with Rule 3( c)'s judgment-designation requirement. 243 
The Seventh Circuit ultimately rejected Navistar's jurisdictional contention 
and reached the merits of Cook's appeal from that judgment.244 Although 
acknowledging that Torres was "somewhat analogous to the facts in this case," 
the court found Foman to be "more precisely on point."245 The court then 
observed that, having "briefed and argued the merits of the underlyingjudgment 
in this case knowing full well that Cook intended to appeal the adverse jury 
verdict," Navistar could not argue at that late point that "it has been prejudiced 
by the defect in Cook's notice of appeal."246 In the end, by opting to abide by 
235. !d. 
236. !d. 
237. !d. Presumably, the basis of the court's dismissal was that the.district court's October 
4 judgment was not a "final decision" within the meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1291 in light of the 
unresolved claims involving Mid-Century. 
238. Cook, 940 F.2d at 210. Rule 54(b) authorizes a district court to enter final judgment 
on fewer than all claims or parties in an action ''upon an express determination that there is no 
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." 
FED. R. CN. P. 54(b). 
239. Cook, 940 F.2d at 210. 
240. !d. 
241. !d. 
242. !d. 
243. !d. at211. 
244. !d. 
245. !d. 
246. !d. (citation omitted). 
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Foman rather than Torres, the court was able to reach the merits of Cook's 
appeal from a judgment that appeared nowhere in his notice of appeal. 
In addition to following the forgiving approach ofF oman, the Seventh Circuit 
has sustained an appeal involving flagrant violations of Rule 3(c)'s judgment-
designation requirement by distorting the meaning of that requirement in order 
to conclude that there was no violation all along. In Librizzi v. Children 's 
Memorial Medical Center, 247 Gilbert Librizzi brought suit against the Children's 
Memorial Medical Center, his former employer, to recover benefits to which he 
was allegedly entitled under a pension plan.248 The district court dismissed the 
suit as untimely and entered judgment in January 1997 ?49 Librizzi later brought 
a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied in March 1997.250 
Librizzi subsequently sought to appeal from both the judgment and the denial 
of his motion for reconsideration.251 In his notice of appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit, however, Librizzi failed to designate the denial of the motion along with 
the judgment. 252 
In rejecting the Medical Center's assertion that this obvious defect in 
Librizzi's notice carried jurisdictional repercussions, the Seventh Circuit was 
satisfied that the notice contained no defect at all.253 The court reasoned that a 
notice of appeal's designation of an underlying judgment "brings up all of the 
issues in the case" for purposes of Rule 3(c)'s judgment-designation 
requirement.254 "Pointing to either an interlocutory order or a post-judgment 
decision such as an order denying a motion to alter or amend the judgment is 
never necessary," the court explained, "unless the appellant wants to confine the 
appellate issues to those covered in the specific order. "255 Accordingly, the court 
reviewed the district court's denial ofLibrizzi' s motion for reconsideration even 
though the notice made no mention of that decision. 
In fairness to the Seventh Circuit, the judgment-designation requirement has 
never been understood as demanding that a notice of appeal make explicit 
reference to each decision that an appellant wishes to challenge on appeal. The 
courts of appeals have universally recognized that, when a notice of appeal 
designates a final judgment in an action, the notice effectively designates all 
247. 134 F.3d 1302 (7th Cir. 1998). 
248. /d. at 1304. 
249. /d. at 1305-06. 
250. /d. at 1306. 
251. /d. at 1305-06. 
252. /d. (observing that "Librizzi's notice of appeal identifies the judgment ofJanuary 1997, 
rather than the order of March 1997 denying reconsideration, as the order under review"). 
253. /d. 
254. !d. at 1306. 
255. /d. 
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interlocutory decisions encompassed by or merging into that judgment.256 In 
Librizzi, however, the decision that the notice of appeal failed to designate was 
neither one that was encompassed by the underlying judgment nor one that 
merged into the underlyingjudgment, considering that the district court's denial 
of Librizzi's motion for reconsideration did not occur until after the underlying 
judgment had already been entered. The Seventh Circuit was thus incorrect in 
asserting that a party "brings up all of the issues in the case"257 by designating 
nothing more than the underlying judgment in a notice of appeal. 
In addition, the explicit language ofRule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure establishes that a notice of appeal must designate a disposition of the 
type of motion at issue in Librizzi in order to satisfy the judgment-designation 
requirement. Under Rule 4(a)(4)(A), when a litigant timely files one of several 
enumerated post-judgment motions- including a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules ofCivilProcedure258 - the time 
to appeal from the underlying judgment runs "for all parties from the entry ... 
256. See, e.g., McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104 (lOth Cir. 2002) 
("[A] notice of appeal which names the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all 
earlier orders that merge into the judgment."); Greer v. St. Louis Reg'! Med. Ctr., 258 F .3d 843, 
846 (8th Cir. ioo I) ("Ordinarily, a notice of appeal that specifies the final judgment in a case 
should be understood to bring up for review all of the previous rulings and orders that led up 
to and served as a predicate for that final judgment."); Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1031 
(7th Cir. 2000) ("In general, a notice of appeal from a final judgment ... is adequate to bring 
up everything that preceded it."); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F .3d I 008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000)("An 
appeal from a final judgment draws into question all earlier, non-final orders and rulings which 
produced the judgment." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United Ass'n of 
Journeymen & Apprentices v. Bechtel Constr. Co., 128 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997)); 
John's Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison & Assocs., 156 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[I]t has 
been uniformly held that a notice of appeal that designates the final judgment encompasses not 
only that judgment, but also all earlier interlocutory orders that merge in the judgment."); Trust 
Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1485 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n appeal from a final 
judgment sufficiently preserves all prior orders intertwined with the final judgment."); Cattin 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 955 F.2d 416,428 (6th Cir. 1992)("[I]t is well settled in this circuit that 
an appeal from a final judgment draws into question all prior non-final rulings and orders."); 
Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923,930 (lith Cir. 1989) ("[T]he appeal from a final judgment 
draws into question all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment."); see 
also 20 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, § 303.21[3][c][iii] ("An appeal from the final judgment 
usually draws into question all prior nonfinal orders and all rulings which produced the 
judgment."); 16A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 2, § 3949.4 ("[A] notice of appeal 
that names the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in 
the final judgment under the general rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of 
all earlier interlocutory orders."). 
257. See Librizzi, 134 F.3d at 1306. 
258. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). 
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of the last such remaining motion."259 The Rule further provides that a litigant 
who seeks to challenge the disposition of a Rule 4(a)( 4)(A) motion "must file 
a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal- in compliance with Rule 
3(c)- within the time prescribed by this Rule measured from the entry of the 
order disposing of the last such remaining motion."260 By expressly linking 
compliance with Rule 3( c) with the filing of a notice of appeal, or the amending 
of a previously filed notice of appeal, after the disposition of a Rule 4(a)( 4)(A) 
motion, the Rules make abundantly clear that the judgment-designation 
requirement will not be satisfied as to an appeal from that disposition if the 
notice designates nothing more than the underlying judgment. 
Notwithstanding these clear dictates, the Seventh Circuit in Librizzi asserted 
that a notice of appeal need not ordinarily designate "a post-judgment decision 
such as an order denying a motion to alter or amend the judgment. "261 The court 
thus felt free to review the disposition of such a motion even though the only 
decision designated in Librizzi's notice of appeal was the underlying judgment. 
In so doing, the court distorted the judgment-designation requirement to the 
point where the relevant provisions of Rule 4 no longer exist. 
C. The Court-Naming Requirement 
As with the party-specification and judgment-designation requirements, the 
courts of appeals have experienced difficulty in consistently applying 
Rule 3( c)'s requirement that a notice of appeal "name the court to which the 
appeal is taken. "262 One approach is to respond to a violation of the court-
naming requirement by dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction in 
accordance with Torres. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pursued this 
course in United States v. Webb,263 in which Earl Anthony Webb's effort to 
appeal from his conviction and sentence was stifled by the failure of his notice 
of appeal to name a court of appeals. 264 The Sixth Circuit's analysis emphasized 
the jurisdictional understanding of Rule 3(c) as developed in Torres and 
reiterated in Smith, while pointing out that the 1993 amendments did nothing to 
alter that understanding.265 The court ultimately concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction over Webb's appeal "[i]n light of Rule 3(c)'s clear mandate that a 
notice of appeal must name the court to which the appeal is taken, coupled with 
259. !d. 4(a)(4)(A). 
260. /d. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
261. Librizzi, 134 F.3d at 1306. 
262. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(l)(C). 
263. 157 F.3d 451, 452-53 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), abrogated by Dillon v. United 
States, 184 F.3d 556, 557-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (en bane). 
264. !d. at 452. 
265. /d.; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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the well-established principle that the requirements of Rule 3(c) are 
jurisdictional in nature."266 
An entirely different response to a violation of the court-naming requirement, 
which the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has employed, is to act in the 
forgiving tradition of Foman and excuse the defect because it neither misleads 
nor prejudices the appellee.267 In Anderson v. District of Columbia,268 Grant 
Anderson brought suit in federal court against the District of Columbia, alleging 
that several of its police officers had used excessive force in arresting him.269 
The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of the 
District, and Grant sought to appeal.270 Although the D.C. Circuit was the only 
court of appeals. with jurisdiction to review the decision in question,271 
Anderson's notice of appeal named the Supreme Court ofthe United States as 
the pertinent appellate tribunal. 272 
In holding that Anderson's notice of appeal was not fatally defective, the D.C. 
Circuit highlighted that it was ''the only [court] to which Anderson may 
266. Webb, 157 F.3d at 453. The approach in Webb has been criticized in one treatise as 
"unduly harsh, as there is only one court to which the appeal could be taken." MICHAEL E. 
TiGAR & JANE B. T!GAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 6.02 n.18 (3d ed. 
1999). 
267. At least two other courts of appeals have used this same approach in connection with 
the court-naming requirement. See United States v. Treto-Haro, 287 F .3d 1000, 1002 n.l (lOth 
Cir. 2002) ("The Government's failure to identity this Court in its notice of appeal, while 
careless if not inexcusable, did not prejudice or mislead [the appellee]. Accordingly, we 
conclude the Government's notice of appeal is sufficient to provide us with jurisdiction."); Ortiz 
v. John 0. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Although designation of the court 
to which the appeal is taken is a mandatory requirement under Rule 3( c), the defect is not fatal 
where the intention to appeal to a certain court may be inferred from the notice and the defect 
has not misled the appellee."). 
268. 72 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
269. /d. at 167. 
270. /d. 
271. Except for certain types of decisions that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
has exclusive jurisdiction to review, see generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)-(d), 1295 (2000), the 
only forum in which an appellant may appeal a district court's decision is the court of appeals 
for the circuit comprising the pertinent judicial district, see id. § 1294(1) (providing that an 
appeal shall be taken "[f) rom a district court of the United States to the court of appeals for the 
circuit embracing the district"). 
Because Anderson filed his action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
see Anderson, 72 F.3d at 167, and the decision is not one that the Federal Circuit had exclusive 
jurisdiction to review, the D.C. Circuit was the only court in which Anderson could have 
appealed. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) (stating that the D.C. Circuit encompasses the District of 
Columbia). 
272. Anderson, 72 F.3d at 167. 
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appeal."273 Notwithstanding that the notice made no mention of the D.C. 
Circuit, the court found that the document conferred "fair notice" both to 
Anderson's adversary and to the court, considering that "it was obvious in which 
court [Anderson's] appeal properly lay."274 "Because the intention to appeal to 
this court may be inferred from Anderson's notice, and the defect in the notice 
has not materially misled the appellee," the court was satisfied with its 
jurisdiction over the appeal.275 
A third approach to a violation of Rule 3( c)'s court-naming requirement is to 
sustain the appeal not by resorting to the forgiving tradition of Foman, but 
instead by distorting that requirement in order to find that there was no violation 
in the first place. The Sixth Circuit adopted this approach when, one year after 
its decision in Webb, the court conducted an en bane reevaluation of the court-
naming requirement in Dillon v. United States. 276 In Dillon, the notice of appeal 
submitted by Thomas Dillon, like that in Webb, did not contain the name of a 
court of appeals.277 Despite its understanding of the jurisdictional nature of the 
273. /d. at 168. 
274. /d. 
275. ld. at 169. Although the D.C. Circuit's approach is perfectly justifiable under Farnan, 
the same result would have obtained even if the court had determined that the question of its 
jurisdiction over Anderson's appeal was governed by Torres. In particular, when a litigant's 
notice of appeal names a court that lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, that court may transfer the 
appeal to the court that would have had jurisdiction over the appeal at the time that the notice 
was filed, and the appeal will proceed in the transferee court as if it had been filed there in the 
first place. See 28 U .S.C. § 1631 (2000) ("Whenever ... an appeal ... is noticed for ... a court 
and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of 
justice, transfer such ... appeal to any other such court in which the ... appeal could have been 
brought at the time it was . . . noticed, and the . . . appeal shall proceed as if it had 
been . . . noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was 
actually ... noticed for the court from which it is transferred."); see also 20 MOORE ET AL., 
supra note 2, § 303.21[3][d] ("If an appeal is improperly noticed to a court that lacks 
jurisdiction, that court may nevertheless transfer the appeal to the proper court, as long as the 
notice would have been timely if filed in the proper court."). 
In light of this transfer mechanism, the D.C. Circuit in Anderson should have given the 
Supreme Court, as the only tribunal named in Anderson's notice of appeal, the prerogative of 
determining the disposition of Anderson's appeal. The Supreme Court, in tum, would almost 
certainly have responded by returning the appeal via transfer to the D.C. Circuit, where the 
appeal would have proceeded as if Anderson had filed it there initially. See 20 MOORE ET AL., 
supra note 2, § 303.21[3][d]. In the end, the D.C. Circuit would have reached the merits of 
Anderson's appeal only after having demonstrated due regard for the court-naming requirement, 
rather than communicating to litigants that a failure to comply with that requirement is readily 
forgivable. 
276. 184 F.3d 556, 557-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (en bane). 
277. /d. at 557. 
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court-naming requirement in light of Torres, 278 a majority of the en bane court 
nevertheless concluded that the panel should have exercised jurisdiction over the 
appeal.279 
The court reached its conclusion by drawing a distinction between appeals 
over which only a single court of appeals would have jurisdiction, and appeals 
over which more than one court of appeals would have jurisdiction. 280 When an 
appeal falls into the latter category, the court stated, the "failure to designate the 
court of appeal will result in dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. "281 
On the other hand, when only a single appellate forum is available, the 
appellant's act of"filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court 
from whose judgment the appeal is taken has the practical effect of designating 
the appropriate court of appeals and thereby eliminating any possible confusion 
with respect to the appellate forum. "282 Upon determining that ''the Sixth Circuit 
represented the only appellate court available to petitioner," the court was 
satisfied that "the notice of appeal was not defective because petitioner did not 
have a choice of forum and filed his notice of appeal in the district court that 
rendered judgment."283 
The only legal authority offered by the Dillon court in support of its approach 
was an Advisory Committee statement accompanying the 1993 amendments to 
Rule 3(c).284 Although acknowledging that those amendments were directed 
solely at facilitating compliance with Rule 3(c)'s party-specification 
requirement,285 the court found that the ''underlying rationale" of the 
amendments applied equally to the court-naming requirement.286 The court 
focused specifically upon the Advisory Committee's observation that "if a court 
determines it is objectively clear that a party intended to appeal, there are neither 
administrative concerns nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal 
from going forward. "287 Incorporating that language into its new standard for the 
court-naming requirement, the court reasoned that "[w]hen 'there is only one 
appellate forum available to a litigant, there are neither administrative concerns 
nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal from going forward' if, 
278. Id. at 558 ("While Torres specifically concerned the proper construction of 
Rule 3( c )(1 )(A), it made clear that the entire rule was jurisdictional in nature."). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 557-58. 
281. Id. at 558. 
282. Id. at 557 (emphasis added). 
283. ld. 
284. Id. at 558. 
285. Id. (noting that ''the 1993 amendments were aimed at ameliorating the effect of Rule 
3( c)( 1 )(A)"). 
286. ld. 
287. Id. (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments)). 
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through inadvertence, an appellant has failed to name the court to which the 
appeal is taken. "288 
Although the Dillon court's analysis suffers from several significant 
shortcomings, perhaps the most egregious is that it entirely purges the court-
naming requirement from Rule 3(c).289 This consequence follows from the 
court's conclusion that a notice of appeal need not explicitly name a court of 
appeals unless the appellant may take the appeal to more than one appellate 
forum.290 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to comprehend 
that there is never more than one appellate forum available to a litigant whose 
appeal is governed by Rule 3. Put another way, if a decision may be challenged 
only through the filing of a notice of appeal that must satisfy the content 
requirements ofRule 3( c), there is one (and only one) court of appeals that could 
have jurisdiction to review the decision.291 Accordingly, although the Dillon 
288. /d. (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments)). 
289. As one might expect, the majority's approach in Dillon produced extensive criticism 
from the judges in dissent, who persuasively argued that the en bane court offered no viable 
legal basis for limiting the application of Rule 3(c)'s court-naming requirement in such a 
manner. /d. at 558-66. Judge Ryan derided the court for having produced an "800-pound 
gorilla rule," construing the court's holding as conveying the message that "even though this 
court has no authority whatever to excuse compliance with Rule 3( c )(1 )(C), it nevertheless has 
the 'power' to do so because more active judges on this court are willing to excuse 
noncompliance with the rule than are unwilling to do so." Jd at 559 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
Similarly, Judge Clay remarked that ''there exists no legal authority for this judicial rewriting 
of the rule by which the majority blithely repudiates the [court-naming requirement] without any 
discernibly cogent reason, explanation or basis for its decision to do so." Jd at 560 (Clay, J., 
dissenting). Judge Gilman, while expressing sympathy for the majority's approach, could not 
join it because there was no ''justifiable way to ignore the clear requirements of Rule 3(c)(l) of 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." 
/d. at 566 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
290. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83. 
291. The two categories of appeals governed by Rule 3 are appeals as of right from decisions 
of the federal district courts, see supra note 17 and accompanying text, and appeals from 
decisions of the U.S. Tax Court, see supra note 200 and accompanying text. As observed 
earlier, the only forum in which a litigant may appeal the decision of a district court is the court 
of appeals for the circuit comprising the pertinent judicial district, unless the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review the decision. See supra note 271 and 
accompanying text. Accordingly, a litigant will have only a single appellate forum available to 
appeal from any decision of a district court. 
With regard to decisions of the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (2000) delineates the 
appropriate appellate forum. The forum in question will depend primarily upon whether the 
case falls into one of six enumerated categories. /d. § 7482(b )( 1 )(A)-(F). For example, in the 
case of a non-corporate petitioner who seeks redetermination of tax liability, the Tax Court's 
decision may be appealed to the federal court of appeals for the circuit encompassing the 
petitioner's legal residence. Id § 7482(b)(1 )(A). If none of those six categories apply, the D.C. 
Circuit has jurisdiction over the appeal. Id § 7482(b)(1). Notwithstanding these provisions, 
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court may have stressed that it had no intention of waiving the court-naming 
requirement,292 it did precisely that by holding that a notice of appeal must 
explicitly "name the court to which the appeal is taken" only in a category of 
cases that simply does not exist. 293 The effect of Dillon is thus that every notice 
of appeal filed with the Sixth Circuit necessarily complies with the court-naming 
requirement, making it impossible to violate that requirement. 
IV. The Case for a No-Nonsense Approach to the Enforcement of Rule 3(c) 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the enforcement of Rule 3(c)'s 
requirements by the courts of appeals has become mired in confusion and 
unpredictability. It is difficult to expect any other outcome, however, 
considering that the Supreme Court held in Foman that noncompliance with 
those requirements was readily pardonable and thus should have no effect on an 
appeal, then held in Torres- while purporting to reconcile Foman- that such 
noncompliance was necessarily fatal to an appeal, and has since reaffirmed both 
approaches on various occasions. In light of this inconsistency, it is not 
surprising that several courts of appeals have shifted radically from one 
approach to another within a span of just a few years. Nor is it surprising that 
some courts, rather than arbitrarily choosing between Foman and Torres, have 
addressed an act of noncompliance with a requirement of Rule 3(c) simply by 
construing that requirement out of existence. The end result is that litigants to 
an appeal cannot predict with any degree of confidence how a court of appeals 
a taxpayer and the government may stipulate in writing that the decision in question may be 
reviewed in a particular court of appeals, id. § 7482(b )(2), but "[i]n the case of any decision of 
the Tax Court in a proceeding under section 7478," the decision may only be reviewed by the 
D.C. Circuit, id. § 7482(b)(3). 
The significant feature of the foregoing regime is that only a single appellate forum will be 
available to a litigant who seeks to appeal from an adverse decision of the Tax Court. 
Accordingly, the Dillon court's reference to an appeal from a Tax Court decision as an example 
of an appeal in which more than one appellate forum would be available, see Dillon, 184 F.3d 
at 558 & n.l, is simply incorrect. 
In addition to appeals from Tax Court decisions, the Dillon court cited appeals involving 
claims for "black lung benefits" and appeals from "NLRB actions" as among those in which 
more than one appellate forum would be available. /d. at 558 n.l. But the relevant decision-
making bodies in those cases are federal administrative agencies, not courts. And when a 
litigant seeks to challenge a decision of a federal administrative agency, the initiating document 
is not a notice of appeal filed with the district court in accordance with Rule 3 but a petition for 
review filed with the court of appeals in accordance with Rule 15. See supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. Accordingly, an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency does 
not implicate Rule 3(c)'s court-naming requirement. 
292. Dillon, 184 F.3d at 558. 
293. Jd. at 557 (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(C)). 
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will respond to a notice of appeal that violates one or more of Rule 3(c)'s 
requirements. 
The Supreme Court now bears the responsibility of restoring order and 
predictability to the enforcement of Rule 3( c) by demanding that the courts of 
appeals apply a no-nonsense approach to defective notices of appeal. Such an 
approach would involve two components. First and foremost, a court of appeals 
must treat an outright failure to abide by a requirement of Rule 3(c) as nothing 
other than a violation of that requirement. This is not to say that the courts of 
appeals should disregard the Supreme Court's repeated admonition that the 
requirements of Rule 3(c) be liberally construed.294 Indeed, it is entirely 
appropriate for a court to give a litigant the benefit of the doubt when a good-
faith effort at compliance is less than exact. It is entirely inappropriate, 
however, for a court to distort the meaning of a requirement in order to 
transform an outright violation into an act of compliance, as the Sixth Circuit did 
in Dillon by effectively holding that a notice of appeal containing the name of 
no court of appeals whatsoever had "name[ d] the court to which the appeal is 
taken" within the meaning ofRule 3(c).295 The effect of such an exercise is to 
amend an established procedural rule by judicial fiat, rather than by the 
administrative mechanism envisioned by Congress. 
Second, once satisfied that a requirement of Rule 3( c) has been violated, a 
court of appeals must dismiss the appeal in accordance with the jurisdictional 
conception of Rule 3(c) adopted in Torres. In this regard, the Supreme Court 
should take the first possible opportunity to address the continuing viability of 
Foman, and do away with it once and for all. If the Court's aim is truly to 
remedy the disordered enforcement ofRule 3( c)'s requirements, it can no longer 
afford to countenance a decision that characterizes a violation of one of those 
requirements as a "mere technicality" and permits a court of appeals to reach the 
merits of an appeal so long as the violation did not mislead or prejudice the 
appellee.296 Indeed, Foman is a prescription not for the enforcement of 
Rule 3( c)'s requirements, but for the circumvention of those requirements. 
An unfortunate consequence of treating Rule 3(c) as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite is that many litigants will lose the opportunity to prosecute their 
appeals. It is particularly troubling when a litigant would have successfully 
obtained relief from the decision below but for a Rule 3( c)-based dismissal of 
the appeal. One can certainly understand how a court of appeals would be 
tempted to overlook an act of noncompliance with Rule 3( c) when doing so 
would allow it to effect justice in that individual case. But as Justice Scalia 
294. See supra note 185. 
295. FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(C). 
296. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962). 
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observed in Torres, a sanction for the failure to comply with a procedural rule 
"always prevents the court from deciding where justice lies in the particular 
case, on the theory that securing a fair and orderly process enables more justice 
to be done in the totality of cases."297 Considering how disorderly and 
unpredictable the enforcement ofRule 3(c) has become, it is high time that the 
Supreme Court shift the focus of the courts of appeals to the totality of cases. 
To the extent that dismissals of appeals become unacceptably high, the 
mechanism of rule amendment remains available to ease compliance with 
Rule 3( c)'s requirements, as was done with the party-specification requirement 
in 1993, or to abolish one or more of them altogether. 
Conclusion 
The uncomplicated nature of Rule 3(c)'s content requirements has not 
translated into uncomplicated enforcement of those requirements by the federal 
courts of appeals. But the difficulty experienced by the courts of appeals in 
enforcing Rule 3(c)'s requirements is understandable in light of the Supreme 
Court's inconsistent guidance on the nature of those requirements. The Court 
established in Foman that violations of those requirements can be readily 
excused, then shifted to a jurisdictional conception of those requirements in 
Torres without making a clean break with Foman, and has since reaffirmed both 
approaches notwithstanding that they simply cannot be reconciled. 
Consequently, the same court of appeals can address the same violation of a 
requirement of Rule 3( c) by dismissing the appeal under Torres for lack of 
jurisdiction, or overlook the violation under Foman if satisfied that the defect 
did not prejudice or mislead the appellee. Then again, in an effort to respect 
both the Torres Court's jurisdictional conception ofRule 3(c)'s requirements, 
while operating in the spirit of forgiveness mandated by Foman, the court might 
distort the meaning of the relevant requirement of Rule 3( c) in an effort to 
conclude that there was no violation at all. 
The solution to this problem of confusion and unpredictability in the 
enforcement ofRule 3( c) is the adoption of a no-nonsense approach to defective 
notices of appeal. By treating a litigant's noncompliance with a requirement of 
Rule 3( c) as such, and responding to that noncompliance by dismissing the 
appeal pursuant to the jurisdictional conception ofRule 3( c) espoused in Torres, 
the courts of appeals would successfully restore the fair and orderly enforcement 
ofRule 3(c) that has been so sorely lacking. 
297. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
